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ABSTRACT
Petroleum development in Texas historically has generated statewide bene-
fits in the form of direct and indirect employment, tax revenue, and personal
income. While Texans generally overestimate their economic dependence on per
troleum, state education subsidies do depend on it heavily. Petroleum produc-
tion has been decreasing in recent years, but utility companies have caused
lignite development and consumption to increase dramatically. Despite these
statewide benefits, both petroleum and lignite development impose local
costs. The adverse impacts most often perceived by local officials are
(i) inadequacy of public services; (ii) financial inability to expand public
services; (iii) housing shortages; (iv) disruption of agriculture; and
(v) social problems. The severity of these impacts depend on the initial
size of the local population, the growth rate, and quality of public manage-
ment preceding and following the boom, the type of energy development, and
the social milieu.
Stbate officials respond to the presence of these local costs in a var-
iety of ways. Some say costs are insignificant and therefore are a local
responsibility. Others recognize them as significant costs which the local-
ities could manage if state obstructions were removed. A third but less
common response is that the costs are significant and that the state should
take action to reduce them. Despite this last recognizition, a state deci-
sion-maker may take no action to reduce costs because to do so would (i) re-
sult in net statewide costs or (ii) would be politically impossible. He
may decide that current state programs and regulations will adequately reduce
the local costs. Or he may decide some new action should be taken, which
could involve either incremental changes in current procedures, additional
programs, or a major restructuring of state government'. Although existing
programs in Texas cannot reduce these local costs, decisionmakers seldom
3suggest new action other than incremental changes. In order to acquire
new programs, one must show (i) that the problems are significant, (ii) that
the state has a responsibility to reduce them, and (iii) that some new
program is the only workable option.
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7THE INVISIBLE BOOMTOWNS: TEXAS AND THE
LOCAL COSTS OF ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Introduction
Energy developments cause certain changes in the communities which host
*
them. Each change can be viewed in more than one way, because of the dif-
ferent ideologies and experiences of those affected. For example, residents
in Wyoming "boomtowns" are more bothered by a large influx of newcomers
than are people in Texas; Wyoming farmers often view these people as de-
stroying their lifestyle, whereas Texans often see them as bearers of pro-
gress and a better future. Residents in energy "boomtowns" in both states
experience higher taxes, overutilized public services, and social problems --
but they associate different net costs or benefits with the development
[54].
While Texas as a whole experiences net benefits from intensive energy
development, localities often suffer net costs. Section I of this docu-
ment portrays Texas' fiscal and economic dependence on continued energy pro-
duction. Although some localities benefit more than others, many of these
benefits (jobs, state revenue, public schools) are evenly dispersed through-
out the state. The costs, on the other hand, tend to concentrate in com-
munities experiencing rapid population growth because of intensive nearby
energy development, especially communities hosting the newcomers supporting
the development but not the actual development itself. As Section II ex-
plains, they get a larger population demanding public services without the
expanded tax base. State officials respond to the existence of these local
costs in a variety of ways. Section III analyzes a decision-making process
that produces these different state responses; from this analysis, Sec-
tion IV outlines the process for implementing new state policies aimed at
reducing these localized costs.
*
Host communities support the facility's population and may or may not
host the facility itself.
8I,. ENERGY PRODUCTION AND THE TEXAS ECONOMY: A STORY OF
STATEWIDE DEPENDENCE ON ENERGY INDUSTRIES
A claim that Texas benefits from, and economically depends on, the
production of fuel may restate the obvious, but the specific nature of this
relationship is not readily apparent. Energy production has not simply
provided the state with revenue, but has fostered and reinforced a parti-
cular approach to state fiscal management. State assistance for some ser-
vices, especially education, depends directly on energy production revenues.
Should oil and natural gas production decrease substantially, Texans would
be forced to decide between taxing themselves more heavily or drastically
reducing state assistance to both public and higher education. Through
taxation of energy production Texans have historically used highly "export-
able" taxes -- those whose incidence is thought to rest on consumers out-
side the state. Unless replaced by some other energy source (such as coal)
significant decreases in oil and natural gas production would mean more than
just locating new revenue sources. It would impose a whole new way of ap-
proaching revenue and expenditure decisions. The following section de-
scribes both the state's economic ties with and its fiscal marriage to
energy production and the predicted future of the relationship.
Oil and Natural Gas Development
The history of energy development in Texas involves three important
fuels: oil and natural gas have dominated energy production for most of the
twentieth century; lignite recently has been revived as an alternative for
natural gas. Although Texas is still a leading producer of both oil and
gas, its production and its reserves are both declining (see Table 1).
Attention has shifted to increased offshore drilling, but so far offshore
wells contribute less than one percent of the state's annual total pro-
*
duction. Despite the decline, petroleum production is still pervasive
across the state, occurring in 211 of Texas' 254 counties [1].
Besides being a major petroleum producer, the state has also become
*
In this study "petroleum" refers to both oil and natural gas.
9Table 1
TEXAS PRODUCTION AND RESERVES OF OIL AND NATURAL GAS
Oil Natural Gas
Production:
Peak Year 1972 1972
% of National Production 37 35
Predicted % annual decreases:
e without price deregulation 4.7 3.1
with price deregulation ~3.1 1.4
Reserves:
Peak Year 1963 1967
% of National reserves 33 31.1
Source: [5].
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a major consumer. Texas industries use more than 11% of the nation's
natural gas, and its electric generating plants burn almost an additional
9% of it [1]. Even agriculture and ranching have become dependent on an
abundance of inexpensive fuels needed to pump water and feed.
Economic Dependence
People in Texas tend to believe that the Texas economy and the govern-
ment's fiscal structure depend on the petroleum industry (as indicated by
comments reported later in this study). However, statistics indicate this
assumption about ecnomic dependence may be overstated. In 1967 petroleum-
related industries were directly responsible for 6% of the state's employ-
ment, 14% of its gross output, and 8% of its total revenue [61]. Demand
multipliers characterize the petroleum industry's indirect impact on the
economy through its interdependence with other Texas industries. Chemical-
related industries' multipliers (about 2.0) are among the highest. However,
petroleum refining and food processing each have multipliers slightly less
than two, crude oil production about 1.4, and Livestock and Poultry about
2.2. Multipliers for the petroleum industries have been decreasing in re-
cent years because of its increasing dependence on imported crude oil [61].
With the assistance of an input/output model, the Governor's Energy
Advisory Council in Texas has predicted changes in the Texas economy re-
sulting from various changes in the production of petroleum products [61].
Without any change in price, they estimate by 1986 production will decrease
*
by 44%, total employment will increase by 12-18%, personal income will
increase by 37-50%, tax revenue will increase by 28-41%, and oil and gas tax
revenue will decrease by 32-18%. In other words, even if production is almost
halved, employment, income, and taxes will still increase. If the prices in-
crease so that production remains almost constant, then employment will be
about 10% higher than the level expected for decreased petroleum production.
Likewise, personal income will be about 13% higher, taxes about 27% higher,
*
A range of percentage changes are given for each variable; the former as-
assumes a linear increase in government spending and export demand and the
latter an exponential increase.
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and energy industry demand multipliers will increase rather than decrease.
If either import prices increase or imports are restricted, these increases
will be slightly less, but still above the baseline, reduced-production
estimates.
What do these figures tell us about Texas' economic dependence on
petroleum? First, petroleum's share of direct employment is less than that
of several other industires, including "agriculture, forestry and fisher-
ies," construction, and wholesale. Their share of the gross product (14%)
could easily pass through the state, especially since large, multinational
firms finance petroleum development. The demand multipliers tell us that
the petroleum industry's output does have a strong impact on the rest of
the Texas economy (because the multipliers are relatively high); however,
they are not significantly higher than other industries which also account
for a large portion of the state's output, i.e., agricultural industries
and food processing. Even if production is drastically reduced, employment
and personal income will continue to grow. Should petroleum production
cease, other industrial sectors, such as farming and livestock, may even-
tually expand, leaving the state's total economy only slightly worse off
than before (allowing time for adjustment). Despite this possibility, peo-
ple in Texas assume the state depends on the petroleum industry and act
accordingly -- taking care not to hamper petroleum production or increase
prices.
Fiscal Dependence
The state's fiscal structure is more clearly dependent on petroleum
production. Over time Texans have become accustomed to taxing energy produc-
tion and processing, which tend to be highly exportable taxes. Should
these tax revenues decrease, Texans would have to decide whether to increase
taxes with a greater state and local incidence, to find another source of
exportable taxes, or to decrease government services. In 1976 direct taxes
on petroleum accounted for 8% of total revenue and 20% of state tax revenue.
The state expenditure most dependent on petroleum industry is state aid
to education. About one fourth of all petroleum production takes place on
state mineral leases, whose revenues support public education. Last year
12
state-owned mineral leases produced more than $180 million for Texas public
education and $200 million for university education [2,3]. The state sup-
plements the lease revenue with tax revenue, about 30% of which comes from
*
direct taxation of petroleum production [5]. Currently proposed legisla-
tion would increase the state's fiscal dependence on the oil and natural
gas industry by substituting a refinery tax for the current ad valorem
tax that supports school districts [4].
The state retains mineral rights to 22.5 million acres [35], of which
4.25 million are submerged offshore lands and 3.25 million are owned by
the University of Texas system. All of these lands have been designated
either public or university school lands. Before the discovery of oil and
natural gas, much of this acreage appeared worthless, but the state's
mineral holdings in west Texas include the oil-rich Permian Basin, and the
offshore lands host extensive oil and natural gas production (See Figure 1).
Profits from the University of Texas lands, rich with oil reserves, support
the operating costs of the University of Texas and Texas Agriculture and
Mechanical University.
State aid to school districts averages 80% of their calculated operat-
ing costs and comes from three funds: the Available School Fund, the Foun-
dation School fund, and the General Fund. The revenue earned from the
Permanent School Fund and public school lands, including lease sales, lease
revenues, mineral bonuses, and royalties are placed in the Available School
Fund along with one-fourth of motor fuel taxes. The Foundation School Fund
is partially supported by the Omnibus Tax Fund, half of which comes from
oil and gas revenues. The state funds available for Texas public education
**
thus depend heavily on petroleum production.
Some environmental regulations have been imposed on oil and natural
gas drilling and production. The Railroad Commission now issues drilling
permits on the condition that proper transportation and disposal of waste
water from drilling activities are assured, effectively preventing pollu-
tion of the water supply. Water and air pollution regulation has reduced
*
Texas currently taxes crude oil production at 4.5% of its wellhead value
and natural gas at 7.5%.
**
The Mid-Continent Oil and Gas Association estimates that oil and gas
taxes pay 28% of state funds spent on public education [1].
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Figure 1. Location of Intensive Oil and Gas Developments in Texas
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environmental damage attributable to processing facilities. The recently
*
authorized Water Conservation and Subsidence Districts and a series of
coastal zone management acts protect environmentally sensitive areas along
the Texas coast.
But while previous oil and natural gas development has taught Texans
to protect the physical environment, they have drawn a different conclusion
about the social environment: cities with serious rapid growth problems
during the oil boom days have "survived;" give the current generation long
enough, and they'll catch up with the demand for public services. Present
day Beaumont and Houston are cited as examples. In the minds of some long-
time rural residents along the coast, "We've boomed and busted and survived
before; we can boom and bust and survive again." In the past people viewed
efforts to mitigate adverse environmental, social, or economic impacts as
a hindrance to energy development. But an increasingly common attitude
maintains that efforts to alleviate impacts can peacefully coexist with
the desire for increased energy production.
Lignite Development
Texas lignite development began in the 1880's when railroad companies
discovered lignite to be a better fuel than wood. Production of Texas coal
and lignite peaked about 1913 but declined to almost nothing by the end
of World War II. One coal-fired electric generating plant started opera-
tion in 1926 and many more followed, but they either shut down or converted
to natural gas as it became a more plentiful, inexpensive and cleaner
fuel [6].
Lignite has recently been "rediscovered" in Texas as an economical
substitute for now expensive natural gas. New surface mining equipment
and transportation vehicles, combined with the higher natural gas prices,
have made it profitable to extract near-surface lignite for on-site conver-
Rapid extraction of water can cause land subsidence, or sinking, and can
be prevented by slower rate of groundwater extraction.
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sion into electricity. In 1954 Alcoa's Sandow aluminum plant began using
Texas lignite, followed by Texas Utility's Big Brown plant in 1972. Since
then numerous lignite surface mines and lignite-fired generating plants
have either been proposed or begun (see Figure 2). Annual lignite production
is expected to reach 55 million tons by 1985, placing Texas among the top
ten coal producing states. Texas has an estimated 10 billion tons of
near-surface lignite and over 100 billion tons of deep basin lignite. At
current prices, about one fifth of the combined Texas lignite reserves are
recoverable, and its BTU value exceeds that of Texas oil and natural gas
reserves combined [8].
Most lignite development in Texas has been sponsored by utility com-
panies. Private utility companies have concentrated along the Wilcox Forma-
tion while municipal and cooperative (property-tax exempt) utilities have
developed lignite in the Jackson-Yegua Formation (see Figure 2). Wilcox
lignite has a higher BTU content per pound and less sulfur than lignite in
the Jackson-Yegua Formation. Utility companies began developing lignite
several years ago, but non-utility companies are just beginning. About
ten non-utility companies are now developing lignite.
Besides showing interest in its own coal, Texas companies are also
showing increased interest in Western coal. At least eight utility com-
panies are building facilities which will burn Montana, New Mexico, and
Wyoming coal (see Figure 2 and Table 3).
Although lignite mining and consumption have increased dramatically
since 1972, currently the state's economy does not depend on it either as
a source of employment opportunities or as a fuel source. Texas utilities
are the major consumers of lignite and in 1975 only 9% of their fuel was
lignite. However, by 1985 this figure is expected to increase to about
23% [10]. State policy encourages utility companies to convert from natur-
al gas to either lignite or coal for generating electricity; given the cur-
rent cost and supply advantages, this policy receives substantial voluntary
support.
*
In 1976, lignite cost about 350 per million BTU and natural gas cost about
$2 (on the intrastate market). Even though lignite-fired generating plants
are more expensive to build than natural gas-fired plants, Texas Utilities'
lignite plants (built in the early 1970's) saved consumers about $1.17 per
million BTU. Recently required stack scrubbers will reduce that economy
somewhat [7].
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Figure 2. Texas Surface Mining Operation and Coal-Fired Generating Plants
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Table 3a
LIGNITE-FIRED GENERATING PLANTS UTILIZING
LOCALLY AVAILABLE NEAR-SURFACE LIGNITE
Plant Location: Company Coal Megawatts Operation
County (City) Formation Date
1. Sandow
2. Big Brown
3. Monticello
4. Martin Lake
5. Forest Grove
6. Twin Oak
7.
8.
Unnamed
San Miguel
9. Grimes
10.
11.
Mills Creek
Darco
Milam (Rockdale)
Freestone (Fairfield)
Titus (Mt. Pleasant)
Rusk (Tatum)
Henderson (Athens)
Robertson (Franklin)
Unsited
Atascosca (Tilden)
Grimes
Rusk (Henderson)
Harrison
Alcoa
TUGCO 1
TUGCO
TUGCO
TUGCO
TUGCO
TUGCO
So. Texas & Medina
Elec. Coop; T.M. P.A.2
T.M.P.A.
TUGCO
ICI
Wilcox
Wilcox
Wilcox
Wilcox
Wilcox
Wilcox
Wilcox
Jackson-Yegua
Jackson-Yegua
Wilcox
Wilcox
iTexas Utilities Generating Comapny
2Texas Municipal Power Agency (sometimes referenced as Texas Municipal Power Pool).
360
575
575
575
575
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
750
1150
400
400
400
400
400
750
1954
1971
1972
1974
1975
1978
1977
1978
1979
1981
1981
1982
1983
1985
1979
1980
1982
1983
1984
1985
H
Table 3b
COAL-FIRED GENERATING PLANTS
USING IMPORTED COAL
Plant Location: Company Source of Megawatts Operation
Couty (City) Coal Date
12. Harrington
13. Plant X*
14. Welsh
15. J.T. Deeley
16. W.A. Parrish
17. Unnamed*
18. Fayette
19. Coleto Creek
20. Morgan Creek*
Potter (Amarillo)
Lamb (Muleshoe)
Titus (Carson)
Bexar
Fort Bend (Richmond)
Unsited
Fayette (La Grange)
Goliad (Fannin)
Howard (Big Spring)
SWPSI
SWPS
SWEPCO 2
City Public Service
Board of San Antonio
Houston Lighting
and Power Company
Houston Lighting
and Power Company
LCRA3 and
City of Austin
Central Power
and Light
TUGCO4
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
(May use lignite)
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Wyoming
Unspecified
Montana
Unspecified
Wyoming
Wyoming
New Mexico
*Estimated Location reported here
iSouthwestern Public Service Company
2 Southwestern Electric. Power Company
3Lower Colorado River Authority
4Texas Utilities Generating Company
360
360
360
475
475
528
528
528
447
447
375
750
750
750
750
750
550
550
550
550
1976
1978
1980
1982
1984
1977
1980
1982
1977
1977
1983
1973
1979
1981
1982
1985
1979
1980
1979
1986
H_00
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Lignite development has very little impact on state revenues. The
state currently imposes no tax on coal extraction, and no lignite leasing
is expected to occur on public lands. A severance tax has been proposed
but its passage is doubtful [9], (Both the Governor and many of the legisla-
tors pledged "no new taxes" and thus far have kept that campaign promise.)
Should the severance tax pass, one fourth of its revenue would accrue to
the Available School Fund [48].
By 1973, lignite mining had disturbed only 3,200 acres in Texas, little
of which was left unreclaimed. An effective Surface Mining and Reclamation
Act, adopted in 1975, prevents lignite (and uranium) miners from either
polluting the water or leaving land unreclaimed [11]. Fortunately, recla-
mation adds only 4% to the cost of Texas lignite, as calculated for Wilcox
Formation lignite in East Texas [49].
The preceding analysis portrays energy development in Texas as a per-
vasive activity which benefits the state through its impact on the economy
and on government revenues. These benefits are dispersed throughout the
state, as exemplified by state assistance to education in Texas. The state
currently encourages the development of both coal and petroleum resources,
in an effort to perpetuate these benefits; what they overlook are the local
costs these developments create. The following analysis of these local
costs will facilitate our later discussion of the state's response to the
expected dispersed benefits and local costs from energy development.
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II. EVIDENCE OF BOOMTOWN PROBLEMS: THEIR APPARENT
CAUSES AND THE LOCAL GOVERNMENT RESPONSES
Overview of Local Impacts
The adverse impacts of energy development most often perceived by
local officials are (i) inadequacy of public services; (ii) financial in-
ability to expand public services; (iii) housing shortages; (iv) disruption
of agriculture; and (v) social problems. Judgements on service quality in-
cluded in this study are those reported to us by local officials. In
general, they emphasize public service problems that reflect local govern-
ments' inability to manage rapid -- even if expected -- population growth
and increased business activity. The following analysis of five communities
shows how the severity of these problems often depends on the initial size
of the local population, the growth rate, the quality of public management
preceding and.following the boom, the type of energy development, and
the social milieu. These variables thread their way throughout the follow-
ing analysis. The conclusion shapes them into a picture portraying their
impact on the local costs of energy development.
The communities studied are experiencing rapid population growth be-
cause of either oil or lignite development. Three oil development towns,
located in southwest Texas, are of special interest: Pearsall and Dilley
(Frio County) and Carrizo Springs (Dimmit County). This part of southwest
Texas has traditionally depended on ranching, but in the last fifteen years
agriculture has gained economic importance. The key ingredient is water,
since there is ample rich soil and a long growing season. If irrigated,
this arid land provides a wide variety of vegetables; watermelons and pea-
nuts are its major crops. In the center of Dilley there is a monument to
the World's Largest Peanut (the Manager claims their area produces more
peanuts than Jimmy Carter ever thought about), and nearby Pearsall
claims to be the home of the World's Largest Watermelon! Many seasonal
21
farm laborers have made these towns their homes. While the population
is typically poor and of Mexican descent (see Table 2) recent racial
conflicts have caused major shifts in local political power which favor
this group.
New oil development has attracted many new businesses to this area,
*
especially a large number of small drilling and service companies whose
dispersed nature makes it difficult to get "company" estimates of the
number of inmigrating families. Thus towns have little forewarning about
population growth. The rapid turnover in drilling crew employment means
that operators may not even know where their employees come from.
Residents in these communities often recite the benefits from
economic development and population growth, but the costs tend to catch
them by surprise. According to local officials, water and sewer
services in Dilley have become seriously overutilized, and its schools
are now overcrowded. Both fire and police protection have become
ineffective, and vacant housing is scarce. Pearsall's officials report
that its water and sewerage capacities have been surpassed and expan-
sions are planned. Currently its schools are overcrowded and in dis-
repair, but future improvements and expansions have been approved.
Neither its fire nor its police departments can adequately manage
the demand for services, although the former has been improving.
Pearsall also suffers from a housing shortage. A Carrizo Springs'
official claims population growth has resulted in overutilized water
and sewerage systems. The quality of their police protection has
deteriorated, but their current fire service is expected to be
sufficient for the near future. Their schools will need expansion in
another one and a half years, despite their recent construction of new
facilities.
In East Texas, new lignite mines and coal-fired generating facilities
have also imposed some social and economic costs. The experiences of two
small towns, Mt. Pleasant (Titus County) and Tatum (Rusk County) are
"Service companies" maintain drilling apparatus and provide operating sup-
plies, such as drilling mud, required by the drilling activities. "Drilling
companies" actually drill the well and contract "service companies" for
maintenance.
Table 2
POPULATION AND ECONOMIC DATA FOR ENERGY BOOMTOWNS
Carrizo Mount
Pearsall Dilley Springs Tatum Pleasant
1970 Population 5545 2362 5600 684 8877
Estimated Current Population 7000 3000 10000 1100 14000
Estimated Annual Growth Rate,
1975 and 1976.
Population 20% 20% 20% 20% 10%
School Attendance 13% 15% -- 10% 3% - 5%
Starting Date, Rapid Population 1/1975 1/1975 1972 1974 1972
Growth
1970 Median Incomel $3,739 ---- $4,059 ---- $5976
Effective Property Tax Rate2 $.55 $.39 $.81 $.63 $.90
'For families and Unrelated Individuals.
2Mill rate times the assessment ratio; rate per $100 market value.
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illuminating. Each town lies adjacent to a surface mining operation and
a generating facility sponsored by Texas Utilities Generating Company
(TUGCO). Mt. Pleasant has experienced rapid growth for the past several
years and Tatum is just beginning to grow. Both have populations with low
to medium incomes and are heavily dependent on farming, ranching, and food
processing industries. Unemployment levels are relatively low in both
communities.
Although Mt. Pleasant aggressively attacked the expected problems
of rapid growth, local officials believe its public services have deter-
iorated. Water and sewerage capacities were surpassed and have been
expanded. Its schools are just adequate for the number of new students
and will be expanded soon. Both police and fire departments face tasks
beyond their current capacity, as do municipal employees in general.
In Tatum, city officials claim the water and sewerage systems are
operating at their maximum capacity and cannot be expanded in the near
future. Its schools have kept up with demand but must be expanded
shortly. Currently, Tatum has no police force but plans to create one
in the near future.
Inadequacy of Public Services
Provision of public services, especially those heavily constrained
by the size and condition of capital facilities, often falters during
periods of rapid growth. Prior to the advent of energy development,
several impacted communities maintained facilities that were barely
adequate -- perhaps in poor condition or operating at capacity for a
small population. The rapid influx of people has required service
expansion and improvement, but few boomtown areas were forewarned about
coming developments or the need to enhance their fiscal capacity. Delays
in providing services have caused serious problems for residents in some
host communities.
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Water Services
Water'is often an initial problem for these communities. Some have
funds for expanding service capacity, but others must suffer inadequate
service systems. Before the recent oil drilling began in Dilley, water
was supplied without charge. Newly arrived industries and drilling
operations began drawing from the same sources, and the city began
charging all consumers for water as it sought additional funds to
build a new well and storage tank. Besides threatening the city's
water supply, the increased usage accelerated the drop in the ground-
water level, which increased the cost of pumping and treating water.
Eight wells out of ten in Carrizo Springs, located on the edge of the
Carrizo Aquifer, have gone dry because of the drop in the water level.
The influx of people over the last four years (not due entirely to
energy development) has hastened the decline of Carrizo Springs'
previously inadequate water service. For the surrounding area, the
water shortage has been described as a serious threat to agriculture.
Sewerage
Overutilized sewerage facilities also plague these communities. Some
were fortunate to have excess capacity or the ability to expand their
facilities to prevent overutilization. But others operate at capacity and
*
cannot issue more bonds. At least two cities, Dilley and Carrizo Springs,
have been reprimanded by the Texas Water Quality Board for continual dis-
charge of almost raw sewage. Dilley had made arrangements to irrigate sur-
rounding farmland with partially treated sewage, but the system has not
functioned properly. The farmers have failed to irrigate regularly, as
planned, leaving the city with partially treated sewage and no disposal
system. During the peak of its boom, one of Mt. Pleasant's sewage treatment
plants was operating at almost twice its designed capacity, causing its discharge
*
Cities may issue bonds for amounts up to a certain percentage (usually 10%)
of their assessed taxable property value; usually separate maxima are set
for water and sewer bonds and other capital improvements.
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to fall below EPA standards. The city faced long delays in expanding
its -sewage collection system. Even after doublings its Sewerage Department
staff and adding new equipment, demands for sewer service were still
twice what the department could handle -- and maintenance jobs were
six to eight months behind schedule [53]. A new policy in Mt. Pleasant
helps control the demand placed on their sewerage system. All indus-
tries must hold sewage, pretreat it, and discharge it over a 24 hour
period rather than during an eight-hour work day. This policy has
allowed the city to delay further sewerage expansion for several years.
Public Schools
A sudden increase in school-age children has caused overcrowding
in some of the public schools, even where steps were taken to prevent it.
Total enrollment has increased as much as 15% a year and has concentrated
in the elementary grades.* Class size often exceeds 35 students.
Schools in poor physical repair before the oil boom are now seriously
overcrowded. For example, Pearsall added six temporary class rooms
in October of 1976, and approved a bond issue to construct new permanent
facilities. But its kindergarten still meets in a condemned building,**
and the area's housing shortage makes it difficult to recruit teachers
(although some new teachers are wives of oil field workers).
Other schools had some excess capacity before the boom which
prevented immediate overcrowding. School officials have assumed a
continuation of their current growth rates and have approved school
expansions to handle the anticipated boom. However, as Carrizo Springs
recently discovered, their predictions may be conservative and further
expansions may be required sooner than expected. Only the Mt. Pleasant
Independent School District received both forewarning about energy
*A Superintendent disappointedly noted that the growth brought them only
one additional football player!
**The city owns this building whicn is being renovated and converted to
a community center.
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development and offers of advance tax payments to meet the expected
demands.* With this cooperation, they have been able to prepare ade-
quately for additional students.
Protective Services
A decrease in the quality of protective services in these boomtown
areas stems from two pressures: increased demand causes services to
become overutilized; overutilization elevates previously insignificant
flaws to serious dimensions. Despite its recent expansion, Mt. Pleasant's
Fire Department faces an increase in fire calls beyond what they feel
they can manage.** In 1976 the State Insurance Board penalized
Mt. Pleasant because of its low firemen/population ratio; to remove
the penalty requires adding at least ten more firemen, another sub-
station, and a pumper [53]. Unfortunately, the city currently has no
funds for such expansion. Several smaller cities with volunteer fire
departments can no longer provide adequate service as they did before
the boom.
The additional demands from rapid growth not only have caused an
overutilization of services but also have exaggerated some of the
weaknesses of existing services. Within volunteer departments poor
response rates were tolerable before the number of calls increased.
But additional calls meant conscientious firemen missed substantial
numbers of work days; this brought complaints from employers. To
overcome this problem, Pearsall purchased better equipment, it increased
the fire department's budget, and the men elected a new, more aggressive
fire chief. Together these actions improved morale and participation.
Before the boom the more rural towns typically had no police
force and depended on the county sheriff for protection. As the demands
on county services increased, the counties often placed more officers
*These taxing arrangements will be discussed in detail below.
**Reported grass fires, for example, have increased ten fold.
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outside towns and encouraged the towns to supply their own protective
services. Because the towns had no experience in operating police
forces, these new officers tended to be ineffective and inadequate for
the job. For example, before the oil boom the Frio County Sheriff's
office voluntarily provided city protection; when their workload almost
doubled, these services to the cities were discontinued. Dilley now
has a two-officer police force where it had none before the boom, and
the city manager describes it as ineffective and expensive.
The increase in crime experienced by smaller communities involves
mostly nuisance problems, but the increased criminal activity in
Mt. Pleasant is more serious. From 1973 to 1975, major crimes (Class
A offenses) per capita increased from .006 to .105, and the incidence
increased from 59 to 197. From 1970 to 1975 robberies, burglaries and
thefts in industrial/comiercial areas rose 759%. The police force
remained at 18 men, but their hours increased and they stopped patrol-
ling residential areas (unless answering a call) [53]. This increase
in crime has been attributed to organized criminal activity in the
nearby Dallas metropolitan area, about an hour and a half drive away.
General Government Services
City services have also fallen short of local needs because the
increase in municipal personnel has not kept pace with the population
growth. A recent survey of public employees in Texas reveals that
cities of a size similar to Mt. Pleasant have approximately 350 public
employees per 10,000 inhabitants compared with only 100 per 10,000
in Mt. Pleasant. The city manager does not expect to "catch up" with
demand for another three years.
Sources of Problems and Their Solutions
Although many factors affect the quality of public services in
boomtowns, the main determinants appear to be the lack of forewarning
and the lack of front-end financing. Because developments involve
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land acquisition, business managers tend to hide their plans. If
communities had expected rapid growth, they could have planned
ahead more effectively. However, predicted growth is seldom guaranteed
growth. A decision to expand public facilities prior to the actual
arrival of new inhabitants involves risks that most local officials
are not willing to take. A sudden decrease in oil prices, for example,
could have caused drilling in the Pearsall Field to cease suddenly.
Unlike the Carrizo Springs Independent School District, many communities
have been unwilling to expand facilities unless company representatives
agree to reveal the number of newcomers expected. When growth depends
on decisions by many companies, ascertaining this number can be
difficult indeed. For example, the Pearsall I.S.D. received word
from the Western Company in September 1976 that approximately 82 families
would arrive that fall. The school officials assumed that six new
classrooms would be sufficient to serve these and other new students,
but their estimates fell short by approximately 4 classrooms. Enrollment
exceeded the predicted level by more than 100 students.
Even where accurate forecasts are available, local governments
may lack the resources needed to provide services. Passing a bond
issue, letting bids, adding properties to the tax rolls, and acquiring
grants and loans all take time. While the process proceeds the
problems intensify.
But these problems can be prevented. When energy development
began in Titus County, TUGCO officials notified the school district
of the expected increase in children. They suggested that the school
district adjust TUGCO's assessed property values so the schools would
receive enough tax revenue in the initial years to manage the sudden
enrolment increase. The adjustment process started with the total
amount of property taxes TUGCO was expected to pay over the coming
three year period. By adjusting the company's assessed property
value, they effectively shifted these 'tax payments toward the earlier years
to help meet the school district's sudden revenue needs. While school
officials have applauded TUGCO for their forethought and considera-
tion, a few have become suspicious of their apparent good
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intentions. The tax pre-payment has helped the school district in the
shortrun, but it has saved TUGCO tax dollars in the long-run. Intentionally
or not, TUGCO underestimated the market value of its property, and there-
fore the expected tax payments for the three-year period. Thus the
company paid fewer taxes than if there had been no agreement and pro-
perty values had been set annually.
Zoning policies have also been used to help alleviate the pressures
placed on public services. Both Pearsall and Mt. Pleasant attempt to
improve service delivery by restricting mobile homes to parks. Long-
time residents have resisted the arrival of mobile homes, but land-
scaping and lawns can reduce some of this resistance. In order to
prevent widespread destruction of their city streets, Pearsall is
creating an industrial park to concentrate movement of heavy vehicles on
roads built for that type of traffic.
Financial Problems Affecting the Provision
of Additional Public Services
Increased Public Service Costs
Few Texans seem to believe that energy development can create finan-
cial problems for local governments. Increased net costs for either resi-
dents, businesses, or the public sector catch them unaware. When oil
drillers coming from the east Texas fields found the cost of living 30%
higher in Dilley, they decided to return to the lower wages and the lower
cost of living in east Texas. When converting a dilapidated school into a
community center, the Pearsall city manager found building materials 30%
more expensive than in San Antonio, only 50 miles away. And grocery stores
increase prices on weekends and evenings to capture extra dollars from oil
drillers.
Increased costs for municipal personnel stems from competiton with
construction firms and service industries. At least two towns have increased
some salaries by as much as 40% in order to hold their more experienced
skilled and semi-skilled employees. The city of Mt. Pleasant competes with
TUGCO for employees. Even after increasing firemen's salaries to $500 per
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*
month, the city still pays far less than the utility company. Pearsall
competes with a drilling service company which recently launched an inten-
sive campaign to attract local employees. The firm requires that employees
live within 10 miles of the plant, which precludes the possibility of com-
muting from metropolitan San Antonio. Previously they had transferred
employees to the area, but the local housing shortage prevented many from
staying. Employment on drilling crews, being much less secure than that
for construction or service industries, apparently does not compete with
municipal jobs. With the driller's higher salary comes job insecurity --
**
a price greater for most municipal workers than the salary difference.
However, a municipality offering less job security might face competition
from these drilling jobs. At a time when these local governments want
desperately to expand their services, when their staffs are working week-
ends and evenings, they find that increased salaries have absorbed much of
their increased personnel allocations.
Revenue Shortages
Since growth increases sales tax and property tax bases, it might ap-
pear that revenues should increase faster than costs. At least in the
short-run they have not. Despite a 19% increase last year in sales tax
revenue, Mt. Pleasant has already increased property tax rates several
times. Even with its 68% increase in sales tax revenues, Dilley finds
itself short of operating funds. One city manager (who wishes to re-
main anonymous) believes his town faces bankruptcy.
*
Before the energy development booms, municipalities had to compete mainly
with agricultural wages, which were generally low. For example, the
Pearsall city manager claims agricultural wages averaged about $1.50/
hour, giving the city $2.30/hour a competitive advantage. New drilling
service companies started workers at $3.75 to $4.00 per hour, substantially
above the area's usual wage rate.
**
Drilling jobs have successfully competed with farming jobs.
All Texas cities have a one-percent local option sales tax [12].
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With revenue-producing activities increasing everywhere, what causes
these financial problems? Although sales tax revenue responds more quickly
to growth than other major revenue sources, there is about a six-month
delay between the commercial establishment's payment to the state and the
state's reimbursement of the city. Pending legislation in Texas might
remove all state and local sales taxes on gas and electric bills [13].
To at least one local official, this move would further hinder local ability to
"keep up" with increasing public service demands. Communities experiencing
rapid growth perceive the sales tax revenues as the key to survival.
School districts receive no sales tax revenue; they depend entirely on
property taxes and contributions from the state. There is a one and a
half to two year delay between the time property is purchased and the time
the taxing jurisdiction receives its revenue. The state's contributions
through the Foundation School Program, based on the previous year's average
daily attendance, lags actual needs.
Since most energy-development takes place on property located outside
the city limits, counties receive more financial benefits (from increased
property values) and experience fewer costly problems. While Dilley,
Pearsall, and their school districts are suffering from increased costs
and insufficient revenues, the County of Frio has managed its affairs
quite well. The County's financial reserves have covered necessary expen-
diture increases and have forestalled increases in the already low prop-
erty tax rate (30 cents per $100 market value). Texas counties
typically provide few social services and concentrate on road maintenance;
thus their expenditures correlate less dramatically with population changes
than do a city's.
Counties may face financial problems when tax-exempt companies sponsor
developments. Municipal utility companies pay no property tax and have
met resistance in rural counties. The Texas Municipal Power Agency
(T.M.P.A), a consortium of municipal utility companies in Garland, Greenville,
Denton and Bryan, is mining lignite and constructing an electric generating
plant in Grimes County (outside its service area). T.M.P.A. is a tax exempt
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"political subdivision"* that finances its operations by selling bonds
and power (although it cannot sell power to anyone but the member
utilities). When T.M.P.A. started its operation in Grimes County,
they explained to the local people what they were doing and that
they were tax exempt. Initially there was no resistance, but even-
tually the school district officials openly opposed the development.
In response to local criticism and complaints, the company hired a
consultant to study the social and economic impacts that its devel-
opment might have and to outline possible solutions. A bill to remove
the tax-exempt status from such companies was proposed but dropped
because its legality was questionable [50].
Inadequacy of Available Solutions
These boomtown communities face at least a temporary cash flow
problem, a period when tax revenues fall short of expenditure needs
because the tax base has not yet reflected the new growth. To solve
the cash flow problem, why not sell bonds that can be repaid when the
tax base "catches up" to growth? Unfortunately, bonding capacity, under
state enabling legislation, also lags growth. It is based either on tax-
able property value or on excess operating revenues. In order to get
some types of revenue bonds (for sewer and water facilities) a city must
collect excess revenues equalling 1.5 times the expected monthly bonding
payments for a twelve month period. General obligation bonds are limited
to 10% of the jurisdiction's market value. Delays in reporting increased
property values affect this bond limit. In many instances, jurisdictions
have already issued bonds up to their current limit. Further improvements
will depend on future grants, loans, surplus tax revenues, or property
value increases.
* The municipal power companies' qualification as a "political subdivision"
of the state specifies their rights and privileges, specifically their
tax-exempt status. The current controversy is whether political subdivisions,
including counties, cities, special districts, and municipal power com-
panies, are forbidden from making payments in lieu of taxes to other
political subdivisions [51].
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Loan-granting agencies often avoid lending money to high risk jurisdic-
tions, which by definition include energy boomtowns. These agencies expect
a population exodus before all their loans have been repaid. Residents who
remain will probably face low-paying jobs similar to those they held be-
fore the boom. Thus banks and other lending institutions concerned with
security and return on investments consider these towns a poor financial
risk.
While the expected "bust" reduces a city's chances for loans, its
current "boom" minimizes its prospects for receiving certain government
grants. Energy development brings in higher paid workers, which increases
the city's income level; it provides some local employment, which
reduces joblessness. High income and low unemployment rates disqualify
certain communities experiencing energy development from receiving some
grants, even though many long-time residents' incomes remain unchanged.
Without grants or loans, providing additional services for the newcomers
means taxing both those with and those without increased financial
benefits.
Both public and private utility companies appear genuinely confused
over the legality of giving financial assistance to local governments.
TUGCO believes it cannot make payments to Mt. Pleasant to alleviate
pressures from rapid growth because the company owns no property there.*
However, a Public Utilities Commission representative claims they may donate
money to Mt. Pleasant. T.M.P.A. believes it cannot make payments in lieu
of taxes to local jurisdictions although another tax-exempt utility company
is currently negotiating payments in lieu to taxes with impacted communities.
Texas Supreme Court rulings in the late 1940's prohibited municipal utility
companies from making payments in lieu of taxes. The state's constitution
is unclear on this issue, and the municipal utility companies have asked
the Attorney General's office for a ruling on their tax-exempt status [51].
*To avoid the legality question, TUGCO has "lent" Mt. Pleasant electricians
to string lights in the city's new ballpark.
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Local Responses to Fiscal Disparities
Control the Development
Neither counties nor municipalities have much control over energy
development. Although utility companies avoid using their power of emi-
nent domain, the threat precludes the county and local jurisdictions from
rejecting the lignite operations. Recently adopted legislation removes the
power of eminent domain from the mineral development activities of both
public and private utilities in the state [14]. Texas counties, lacking
ordinance making powers, have almost no control over energy developments
within their jurisdiction. The past three legislative sessions have seen
proposals to give zoning authority to counties, but the real estate and
ranching lobbies have been able to defeat them. When the current proposal
[15] was reported out of committee, its broad ordinance-making authority
was considerably trimmed. Certain types of ordinance-making powers, such
as land-use zoning and control over food and fiber production, explicitly
were denied counties. But the remaining powers would allow counties to
adopt building codes, housing codes, health and sanitation licensing, and
subdivision regulations. Although the House has passed the bill, it is
facing stiff opposition in the Senate committee. Should the proposal
pass, counties would be better able to manage problems of energy development.
Increase Local Tax Burdens
Both state officials and the general public unfamiliar with boom-
town problems often resent the boomtown's reluctance to finance additional
public facilities with loans, bonds or increased property taxes. They
see no reason for state assistance to communities not yet taxing themselves
to the maximum. However, considering the nature of energy boomtowns, this
reluctance has merit and deserves closer attention. First, newcomers
generally have higher income than long-time residents, yet those least
able to pay end up bearing the brunt of initial facility expansion.
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Second, a "bust" period (substantial population decrease) will follow the
current "boom" unless cities can attract permanent replacement industries --
a possible but not probable event. Facilities which accomodate the larger
boom population will be excessive for the smaller permanent population, but
the latter gets left with bills for both themselves and those who have
moved. Communities perceive higher taxes as a subsidy for energy, especially
where utility companies are developing lignite outside their own service
areas.
Seek Federal Assistance
Rather than burden their own people -- or the state -- with excessive
capital costs, local governments have sought federal financial assistance
to improve their public services and housing. This approach conflicts with
a desire among rural residents to avoid dependence on federal funding, but
they "justify" their action by arguing that no other assistance is avail-
able and that the federal dollars are partially "theirs" -- why suffer
higher taxes when money already paid to the federal government can solve
the problems? Although people express uneasiness about federal funds
(they would prefer state assistance), they have turned to federal funds as
a last resort, having tried unsuccessfully to acquire state funds.
The smaller cities affected by the oil boom have found Farmers' Home
Administration grants easier to come by than funds from other agencies.
Both Pearsall and Dilley have received funds for subsidized rental housing
(24 units and 46 units, respectively) and area residents have qualified
for Farmers' Home low-interest loans. Dilley has received a $275,000
Farmers' Home grant to construct a water treatment facility and is seeking
an additional $325,000 loan.
The cities have used General Revenue Sharing funds as well as Com-
munity Development Block Grants for capital improvements and repairs.
Mt. Pleasant used $150,000 of its Community Development fund to make water
and sewerage improvements. Pearsall spent last yeard $63,611 revenue
sharing installment on road improvements.
Through the Texas Parks and Wildlife Department, the U.S. Bureau
of Outdoor Recreation provided Mt. Pleasant with $44,000 for park construc-
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tion. Dilley has recently requested $129,000 to build a park.
Several boomtowns are using or have applied for Economic Development
Administration money for industrial parks. Pearsall has requested
$500,000 for this purpose, and is seeking a $1.5 million EDA grant for a
new Municipal Complex. Dilley received a $145,000 EDA grant for a new
City Hall. Carrizo Springs has a $2.3 million EDA grant to build a new
water treatment facility.
Housing and Urban Development funds have helped several boomtowns:
Dilley has used HUD Section 8 funds for low-income housing and $100,000
from another HUD fund for street improvements; Pearsall has a $150,000
HUD grant to convert an old kindergarten building into the West Side Com-
munity Center in a low-income neighborhood.
The City of Pearsall has received $4,000 through the Intergovernmental
Personnel Act to survey and analyze local salaries.
Two conditions explain the "grantsmanship" among these rural
communities previously unfamiliar with federal programs. First, both
the Councils of Governments and the Department of Community Affair§
inform towns about available federal programs and teach them how to
apply. Second, the more "successful" towns have new professionally-
trained managers, hired specifically to solve public service problems.
Cooperate with Other Jurisdictions
One very unusual and effective solution to energy impact problems
runs contrary to common expectations. A few years ago, Mt. Pleasant
and Titus county operated as many do in Texas, with little cooperation
between them. At the city's suggestion, they now participate in a
"Progress Through Unity" program.
City officials sensed that the city, county, and school district
could all benefit by cooperating. To demonstrate this philosophy, the
city lent the school district its paving equipment to construct a new
parking lot. Soon after that the city organized a basketball team;
the school district donated the use of its facility. Then the county
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needed a new land fill site and couldn't find one. The city offered to
share its site with the county, splitting the expenses accordingly.
Through these moves the city demonstrated to both county and school
district officials that cooperation could work -- to everyone's advantage
The city became more aggressive. It sponsored dinners for repre-
sentatives from all county, city, school, and non-profit agencies. The
organizations eventually adopted the motto, "Progress Through Unity",
and a logo (appearing on letterheads), and they meet monthly to discuss
problems and possible solutions.
In the first year the city spent several thousand dollars developing
this program, but the payoffs for participants justify the expenditures.
The creation of a new water district covering part of the county provided
the needed bonding capacity to construct Lake Bob Sandlin. A new hospital
district has supplied improved ambulance service to the county and city.
The city police and the county sheriff help each other when the need
arises. Both the county and the city finance the fire services -- the
county donated a brush truck and pumper which are housed in the city fire
station and operated by city employees. The city responds to fire calls
in the surrounding countryside. The state's provisions for special dis-
tricts and its Interlocal Contracting Act are the primary enabling
laws which permit this type of cooperation among jurisdictions within
a county [16].
What caused the Mt. Pleasant/Titus County cooperation to succeed
when attempts in other counties have failed?* A recent shift in attitudes
increased the political power of people bent on solving the problems
produced by rapid energy development. They avoided cooptation, by carefully
maintaining the balance of power among county, city, and school district.
They let officials experience the benefits from cooperation before
they began formalizing it.
*Carrizo Springs and Dimmit County merged police forces-but city residents
claim the county has controlled it and has reduced coverage of the
city.
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Adopt Commerce Location Policies
Despite the benefits of cooperation, each locality must solve the bulk
of its financial problems on its own. While "Home Rule" cities, like
Mt. Pleasant, may initiate annexation proceedings, "General Law" cities,
like Dilley and Pearsall, can only try to motivate taxable businesses to
* **
locate within their boundaries. Boomtowns have used utility rates to
pull businesses into the city, at which point the city can gain sales and
property tax revenue [17]. The boomtowns charge utility rates as much as
50% higher outside the city than inside and charge higher connection fees
outside the city. Several also charge businesses the full cost of extend-
ing utility lines to property outside the city. Officials in Pearsall do
not feel that this policy has affected the location of new businesses,
although it has helped them to recoup losses incurred when mobile home
owners' leave without paying utility bills.
Another utility policy has affected business location. Dilley has more
requests for service connections than it can handle, so it gives no guarantee
that services will ever be provided outside the city limits. Yet owners
of commercial property outside the city limits who petition for annexation
find themselves suddenly near the top of the city's work schedule. The
additional city property taxes appear to be less costly to businesses than
either long delays in receiving city services or the cost of supplying
their own.
Two current legislative proposals would increase the ability of small
cities to annex tax paying property. One bill would reduce the minimum
population requirement for Home Rule cities from 5,000 people to 1,500
*.
Cities with at least 5,000 inhabitants may adopt Home Rule Charters, which
allows them to annex set amounts of contiguous property, with the consent
of the property owners to be annexed. The smaller General Law cities have
fewer local powers. They may not initiate annexation proceedings, but
must wait until contiguous properties petition for annexation.
**
"Utilities" refer to water, sewerage, and gas serivces supplied by the
city. Cities also may set rates for privately supplied gas services.
Several cities reported mobile home owners leaving without paying $200
utility bills. Cities usually depend heavily on these service charges to
finance city operations, since mobile home owners pay little property taxes.
Some towns are raising deposits in order to protect themselves from the loss
of utility service charges.
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[18]. Another proposal would give annexation privileges to all munici-
palities, whatever their size or classification [19]. Relaxed annex-
ation laws would help municipalities acquire benefits more commensurate
with the costs they bear.
To guarantee a stable tax base in the long run, several cities are
creating industrial parks and are seeking permanent industries. So
far their searches have failed; a commercial food processing plant
planned for Dilley has been postponed, as area farmers, suffering a
farm-labor shortage, could no longer guarantee the quantity of produce
needed to support the operation.
Housing Shortages
A shortage of housing plagues all boomtowns. The conventional housing
industry cannot respond quickly enough to the demand for new homes,
and there are almost no older homes for sale. Private market housing
supply lags demand by about a year, reflecting both the time required
to shift resources to new areas and the homebuilders' demands for a
guaranteed market. Rural areas in Texas have few local builders, and
contractors from nearby metropolitan areas are reluctant to supply
these new markets. For example, local builders in Pearsall and Dilley
cannot respond to the demand for housing, and the San Antonio builders,
only fifty to sixty miles away, have shown no interest in the Pearsall-
Dilley market. Originally the local builders could not meet Mt. Pleas-
ant's housing demand; after a one and one half year delay, Dallas area
builders, about 100 miles away, began serving the Mt. Pleasant area.
This absence of non-local builders has complicated the housing
situation in Pearsall, since the local builders generally provide
"substandard" housing ineligible for FHA and VA housing programs. If
mortgage money were readily available, the lack of federal guarantees
would not matter. However, local bankers follow very conservative
lending policies and are reluctant to provide mortgage money to well-
paid employees associated with the oil development. Even when service
company employees intend to stay twenty years, banks perceive them as
unstable and as a risky venture.
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Increased costs of both buying and renting housing also point to a
housing supply shortage. In the oil boom areas, small modular homes which
sold two years ago for $18,000 now sell for $30,000; small brick homes in-
creased in price from $28,000 to $45,000. Residential lots within cities
more than doubled in price. Even the cost of mobile homes now exceeds the
previous cost of some housing; mobile homes have been selling for $12,000
to $15,000.
Mobile homes are a common short-term solution to the housing shortage.
The city of Tatum reports approximately 140 mobile homes, and Carrizo
Springs has almost 400 in its vicinity But the shortage of public ser-
vices described earlier affects even this solution to the housing problem.
Several towns are a month or more behind in providing utility connections.
Tatum recently spent almost $100,000 extending utility lines to 114 sites
for new single family homes. They have no additional bonding capacity to
finance additional utility extensions.
A shortage of available mobile home sites has also restricted the
supply of temporary housing. Several boomtowns have relaxed mobile
home restrictions because other available housing is inadequate. Pearsall
limits mobile homes to parks, but the existing parks are full. A revised
ordinance permits mobile homes on single residential lots if all nearby
land owners consent. The condition requiring neighborhood approval was
designed to permit property owners to exclude mobile homes when land owners
felt threatened or bothered by their presence in a single-family area.
Some neighborhoods, especially lower-income areas, consistently have
done that. However, other people admittedly have used this power to
exclude particular kinds of people rather than a particular type of
housing. At least two incidences have been reported where property
owners excluded mobile homes because their owners were either black or
involved with the oil development.
The response of one service company in Pearsall reflects the
seriousness of this housing shortage. The company recently transferred
almost 100 families to Pearsall. When many could not find homes, the
company had to transfer them elsewhere. To avoid that problem in the
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future, the company leased 23 mobile homes and made arrangements with a
Pearsall land-owner to create a mobile home park for them. The company
had never been involved in the housing business before and disliked it
greatly. They realized, however, that without at least a temporary
supply of housing their operation was restricted to the local labor
force.
TUGCO's response to the shortage of mortage money in Mt. Pleasant
reflects that area's housing problem. The company made prior arrange-
ments with local banks and savings and loan associations for mortgage
financing for new homes constructed by local contractors. Although
interest rates and downpayment requirements were high, the high-salaried
TUGCO and subsidiary workers could afford it. After solving the financ-
ing problem, the shortage of local contractors and available public
service utilities still restricted the supply of housing [53].
Another common response to the housing shortage is construc-
tion of federally subsidized housing for low and moderate income families.
However, that solution does not affect the supply of housing for middle
and upper income families.
Disruption of Agriculture
Oil Development Areas -- Southwest Texas
The conflict between energy development and current land uses is
perceived to be short term. The nature of energy development in Texas,
the supply of water, and the attitudes of farmers and ranchers cause
people to define current conflicts as temporary. Some farmers and
ranchers have ceased operations because of their new oil revenues, but
people generally expect them to return to work or to lease their land
to others.
Oil drilling causes little conflict with ranching: drilling
activities are locally concentrated and the locations are sparsely
scattered over a large area. Once drilling is completed, only a pump
and its surrounding embankment occupy space.
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While it goes on, drilling does conflict with farming schedules and
procedures, and it has definitely drained farming of its unskilled and
semi-skilled laborers. A shortage of farm labor in the Frio County
area made a proposed food processing plant unpromising. One farmer,
not to be defeated by oil development, turned to a previously latent
labor market -- women. He's been so pleased with their work that he
claims in the future he'll only hire men for heavy labor.
A water shortage appears to be serious in the Carrizo Springs area;
both oil drilling and refining consume significant amounts of water.
The area has reportedly begun a permanent shift away from farming toward
ranching and oil development, specifically because of the water shortage.
Lignite Mining Areas -- East Texas
Strip mining and the submersion of land for new reservoirs to
support lignite mining and electric generation in East Texas has threatened
agriculture and ranching. Over the next 25 years, a projected 65% of Titus
County will be strip-mined, and reservoirs will cover much of the unmined
land [53]. Strip-mining takes land out of production for nine to ten years.
Actual mining activities usually take three or four years, and the Texas re-
clamation law requires an additional six-year test period--with no grazing or
farming--to guarantee complete and proper land reclamation [20].
With or without energy development, East Texas lands would probably
soon be converted to big business ranching operations; energy development
simply accelerates that trend. Many elderly ranchers and farmers are
selling their properties outright and are moving to the city. While many
of these properties have been in the same family for several generations,
the children of current owners have left the area or have taken up other
occupations. Although these people and their children are leaving
farming and ranching permanently, their property is expected to return to
production once the land has been reclaimed. The utility company purchas-
ing the land is expected to sell the property eventually in several large
parcels to be operated as ranches and farms. Until mining is complete
43
and the land has been reclaimed energy development is expected to conflict
with previous agricultural and ranching land uses.
Social Disruption and Resistance to Development
Attitudes Toward Rapid Growth and Newcomers
Sources of Disfavor or Opposition
One explanation for the relatively positive view toward energy develop-
ment in Texas is the absence of serious social disruption such as that ex-
perienced in Montana and Wyoming. Texans have seldom directed their ef-
forts toward stopping energy development. Within this overall pattern,
however, differences can be discerned. Ranchers and farmers, the influen-
tial landowners, have shown less enthusiasm than other groups for energy
development. These land-owners have been influential in county politics
for several generations, and they stand to lose local political control.
In Dilley they have courted the newcomers by sponsoring a barbeque, but
these inmigrants appear uninterested in local affairs. Inmigrants em-
ployed by power companies have been more active politically than either
construction workers or drillers and have contributed to a shift in poli-
tical power in Mt. Pleasant.
Bankers in Southwest Texas have resisted the new arrivals, causing
some newcomers to feel so uneasy that they bank outside the city just to
avoid contact with these people. Some long-time middle and lower-income
residents also regret the arrival of these newcomers. Many people inter-
viewed in the course of this study commented on the newcomers' orderly
behavior, but complained about their air of superiority. Certain city
staff in Dilley resent the newcomers because they create extra work for
the city and often leave large unpaid bills. While Dilley residents reject
open resistance, some neighboring Pearsall residents have used their veto
over mobile homes to exclude the "oil people."
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Several cities reported that residents have an initial aversion to
additional growth; while these feelings seem to subside after a year or so,
active resistance to development has occurred in two cases. In the
first case, two utility companies, TUGCO and SWEPCO, want to build coal-fired
generating plants in an area that already has two such plants and that
happens to be in SWEPCO's service area. SWEPCO representatives have claimed
that the ambient air quality standards will permit only one more facility.
Some of SWEPCO's customers oppose the proposed TUGCO plant because they
want SWEPCO to receive the permit for the third and supposedly final
facility. The residents are not concerned with the arrival of another
generating plant -- as long as their service company owns it. In the
second case, Grimes County residents oppose the T.M.P.A. development
because it pays no property taxes.
Residents in neither area have opposed the facilities on environ-
mental grounds. Environmentalists in Texas have resisted some
projects, but only if they are expected to cause significant pollution or
to seriously endanger the physical environment. For example, some San
Antonio residents have resisted a request by their municipal power company
for a six-month variance from state air pollution regulations. At the
state level, the Texas Environmental Coalition has succeeded in stopping
an allocation for unspecified water development projects.* Texans balance
their need for economic development against their need to protect the
environment. This trade-off is displayed through the Air Quality Control
Board's enforcement procedures discussed in greated detail in Section III.
In areas experiencing energy development, people have not vocalized
much opposition to facilities on environmental grounds. To date almost
all lignite mines have been properly reclaimed and more serious water
pollution has been prevented. Air pollution from lignite-fired generat-
ing plants has not incurred popular alarm. Units #1 and #2 of TUGCO's
*The Coalition unites various Texas chapters of state environmental groups
and national groups, such as the Sierra Club and the Audubon Society;
however, it has little clout at the local level and is only marginally
effective at the state level.
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Monticello Plant were under construction before the EPA's new source
standards and thus are subject only to Texas standards (which are
lower). Their particulate emissions of 4000 pounds per hour (50 to
60% o.pacity) exceed the 1500 pounds per hour (30% opacity) required
by Texas law. By December 1977 the Air Quality Control Board antici-
pates only 1000 pounds per hour emissilon, the 2reduction being due to
TUGCO's retrofitting with bag houses [52]. The facilities have no
scrubbers to reduce sulfur dioxide emissions, which are about twelve
to thirteen thousand pounds per hour (within Texas regulations). When
the facility first began operating, the excessive particulates emission
(at 100% opacity) instigated only a few local complaints. And despite
this incidence, local residents have shown no resistance to proposed
additional generating facilities. If the Monticello plant's current
emission level does not offend people, then it is unlikely that the
newer facilities (subject to stiffer emission standards) will disturb
them. It appears that as long as state forests and wildlife reserves
are maintained, and as long as projects don't pollute or leave surface
land less valuable than it was at the outset, environmental advocates in
local communities are satisfied that the environment has been properly
protected.
Sources of ApprovaL-- A Desire for Growth
Rural Texans tend to perceive rapid population growth as long-
desired economic development. But they fail to distinguish between
normal growth and rapid growth. In order to get any growth, people
assume they must tolerate all the problems peculiar to rapid growth.
In Dilley, the majority of the city councilors are businessmen. They
are so fearful of discouraging growth that they have avoided restrictive
policies, including a mobile home ordinance, and have
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hesitated to enforce even existing zoning regulations. -
Besides the business leaders, other citizens express'a desire for
growth because it means "progress" -- new ideas, new faces, oppor-
tunities for their children, better stores, etc. They.often explain,
with some humility, that they are somewhat provincial and "out of
date", arguing that growth will "bring them into the mainstream" of
modern America and will broaden their perspectives. As long as new-
comers "behave", many townspeople are not threatened by them and
even welcome them.
Texans also tend to believe growth from energy development will
bring financial benefits -- better salaries, employment opportunities,
revenues from leases and sales, and increased property tax revenues.
This faith in financial gain seems to obscure any realization that
not all people will benefit financially. The city manager of
Mt. Pleasant estimates that 20% of the city's population will face
higher property taxes, rents, and living cost without realizing any
increase in income or wealth. The manager in Dilley believes his city is
in the same situation.
One indicator of local attitudes toward growth is a desire to attract
other industries to replace the boom's temporary businesses. Instead of
discouraging temporary growth, boomtowns in Texas tend to construct perma-
nent facilities and to seek permanent industries to replace the temporary
businesses.
Mt. Pleasant residents have been the most active in attracting new-
comers, as indicated by their participation in financing a new community
center. When city and county officials together could not finance a new
community center, city residents decided to supplement the government's
money with private donations. Eventually residents raised more than
$200,000 to build a community center. Earlier, city officials tried to
raise funds for the project but were unsuccessful. Long-time residents
felt a growing town should have a civic center large enough to
handle community meetings. A new center might make the town look more
inviting to newcomers and new industries. Also, in Mt. Pleasant
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an enterprising young couple is converting several contiguous and empty
downtown stores into a small shopping mall, expected to discourage the
iloss of downte-w-n business to two new shopping centers.
Social conflict: between newcomers and long-time residents has not
-developed into open confrontation, but Mt. Pleasant's leaders have -still
taken steps to ameliorate what little animosity has surfaced. The city
sponsors barbeques during good weather, inviting city, county, school
district, and company officials and citizens. Their philosophy is that
social events facilitate friendhips that will ultimately develop into
mutual understanding.
Informal help has come from TUGCO. Initially people perceived
inmigrant TUGCO workers as "uppity" -- displaying an air of superiority,
trying to control local politics, but thinking themselves immune from
local regulations. In response to community complaints, the company
instructed its employees to mind their manners, to participate in
community organizations and events (but not to run for office), and to
show more respect for Mt. Pleasant's social ways. People report a
noticeable change in employee behavior; they are more active and
socially accepted than are newcomers in the oil development areas.
Why has TUGCO shown so much concern about local reactions? Several
explanations seem probable, although none can be "proved." Sources
indicate that the company believes its future depends heavily on their
reception at the local level. If suspicion and hostility develop, then
the long-run efficiency of their operation is threatened. Another
explanation is that TUTT(CO is strictly an intrastate company and, there-
fore,- feels a responsibility toward Texas.
Some land owners, administrators, and politicians have bargained effec-
tively with the power companies over lease terms; others have not. One ran-
cher, when asked why she accepted a lower lease price than others, responded,
"I was afraid if I tried to bargain for a higher price, they would change
their mind. They told me it was a now-or-never offer." Like many people
in East Texas, where TUGCO is developing the lignite mines, she displayed
great faith in the utility company and took them at their word.
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These Texans believe that TUGCO is genuinely concerned with their welfare.
Defining the Problem: Comparing Costs and Benefits
Temporary Costs
How do people reconcile the conflict between the new problems they face
everyday because of energy development and the high value they place on the
benefits from growth? Their tax bills have increased; they must pay for
water that used to be free; roads are in disrepair; farm help is scarce;
their schools are crowded, houses and cars must be locked. In part, they
perceive these as temporary costs or inconveniences that must be tolerated
in order to reap the expected long-term benefits.
Their image of energy development is incompatible with an image of
poverty and social problems. The prevalent perception combines energy de-
velopment and prosperity and makes it very difficult for Texans living out-
side the impacted areas to imagine adverse impacts from energy development.
A great many Texas cities began as boomtowns, serving either oil, natural
gas, or cattle production activities. Any previous cost/benefit disparities
in these towns apparently have disappeared. People now see prosperous com-
munities offering residents a variety of activities, employment opportunities,
and community amenities. However, history may be a poor teacher, since it
immortalizes only selective stories -- people remember the good and forget
the bad. Stories of suffering and hardship have not been retold from genera-
tion to generation. In addition, the public's definition of "adequate"
public services and living conditions in the late-nineteenth and early-
twentieth centuries differs substantially from today's expectation of muni-
cipal services. Past and current definitions of problems are not comparable.
The major lesson history has taught Texans is that somewhow, whatever their
problems during the boom, some towns survived and became pleasant places to
live. (Of course, the story does not report the locality "attrition rate.")
In light of their historical experience and their expected future benefits,
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communities perceive their current problems as temporary and tolerable and,
indeed, as the price for future benefits.
Long-term Benefits
Texans tend to believe that energy developments in the 1930s and
1940s saved Texas from the worst of the Great Depression, and that energy
production has since shielded them from the worst of this country's reces-
sions. But past and current definitions of "long-term benefits" may not
be comparable. People fail to see the differences between previous and
current energy development. Houston and Beaumont have refineries as well
as oil and natural gas wells, whereas Dilley and Pearsall have no refinery
and, currently, no wells. Refineries are built to operate for an indefinite
number of years, since they are not entirely dependent on a local supply
of fuel, but lignite-fired generating plants in Rusk and Titus Counties have
a 20-year life expectancy, at which time the lignite will have been extracted
and the generating plants shut down (or converted to another type of fuel).
The expected long-term benefits from growth entice people to overlook today's
problems. Many current boomtowns have never had significant growth but
have long dreamed of it. Their failure to distinguish between moderate
and rapid growth may blind them to the true cost of growth's benefits.
Some city administrators, especially in oil drilling areas, are less
confident that these problems will disappear. Most mineral properties be-
ing developed are those outside the city limits; municipal residents will
still have low incomes when drilling ceases; they will still face loan
payments after service industries and mobile homes have left. Their in-
tent is to reap what short-term benefits they can and try to attract permanent
industries that are independent of drilling activities. Unfortunately, the
short-term problems consume most of their time.
Responses to Expected New Costs
Why is it that these officials, perceiving the costs of extensive
energy development and rapid growth, have not tried to stop them? Prevalent
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support for two ideological values discourages that response: (i) freedom
to develop one's property, within legal standards, and (ii) freedom of
movement. Large, politically influential landowners with power at stake
in maintaining the status quo may grumble about the newcomers but they will
not try to stop them -- if we remove development rights from one person
we may remove them next from a rancher. Maintaining the character of
their town is not as important to them as maintaining the status of indivi-
dual property rights. The freedom to move, to live anywhere one pleases,
is also held in high esteem. While some of the townspeople would just as
soon not see drilling crews walking their streets or troublesome migrant
children in their schools, they do not see that they have the right to ex-
clude newcomers from inmigrating.
Insistence on local control and local individualism encourages local-
ities to manage their own problems alone, rather than combine forces with
others. This attitude precludes regional approaches to the land use problems.
At least one incident hints that this attitude is changing. Several coun-
ties in east Texas are working together with a private consultant to help
them understand the impacts from lignite development and the alternative
solutions. Rather than give blind allegiance to growth, they are beginning
to question its role as the bearer of -abundant gifts. 'While they have not
opposed growth, they realize that serious problems may result.
The Complication of Racial Conflict
In Southwest Texas the response to growth has been complicated by
racial antagonism between the Mexican-Americans and the Anglos. Although
Dilley is about 75% Mexican-American and Pearsall about 80%, until a few
years ago most elected officials in both communities were Anglo. Recent
political activism among the Mexican-Americans caused tension between the
two ethnic groups but shifted political power toward Mexican-Americans, a
shift coincident in time with the oil boom. As a result Frio County faces
court-ordered redistricting, and a special election for all county commis-
sioner positions.
In general, the political leaders of both ethnic groups face an un-
certain future. By September 6f 1976 they had developed a working rela-
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tionship in many places, but recently they have lined up on opposite sides
of the rapid growth issue. Anglos who are losing control appear less eager
for oil related growth, whereas the Mexican-Americans, many of whom operate
*
small businesses, tend to favor growth.
In the Dilley Independent School District, all property outside the
city limits had been classified as ranch property assessed at $35 per acre,
and improvements were tax exempt. The wealthier families often live out-
side the city limits whereas the poor, predominantly Mexican-American fam-
ilies, tend to live within the city. Mexican-American representatives to
the School Board proposed and won (i) repeal of special tax status for
properties outside the city limits and (ii) property revaluation. This
move reinforced popular support for new Mexican-American leaders and
quickly increased tax revenues.
Carrizo Springs has also been affected indirectly by racial strife in
**
a neighborhing community, Crystal City. Conflicts in the community of
Crystal City caused large numbers of its Anglo residents to move to Carrizo
Springs. Both Anglos and Mexican-Americans, shaken by the experience of
Crystal City, have worked to prevent a repeat in Carrizo Springs.
Variables Affecting the Severity of Local Costs
Initial City Size
The five categories of costs discussed above are found in almost
every energy development town, but'the severity of each-cost varies accord-
ing to the particular characteristics of each town, its region, and the
*
The influential Anglos hope the inmigrants will increase their political
power, but the drilling personnel'have displayed little interest'in local
politics.
**
Conflicts in Crystal City began in 1963 with the organization of a
Mexican-American political party, which fielded candidates for city offices.
Although there was no violence, the city split politically over the race
issue which created tension and apparent hatred between the two ethnic
groups.
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type of energy development it hosts. The severity of a particular cost may
be a function of more than one variable. For example, one town character-
istic may cause the public service cost to increase while a second causes
it to decrease. The previous discussion concentrated on the final outcome,
the severity of each cost; the following discussion emphasizes the factors
affecting these costs.
As mentioned earlier, five variables influence the severity of
local costs. The initial city size partially determines the types of public
services available before the boom and the city's ability to improve them,
both of which affect the severity of boomtown costs. Larger cities tend to
provide more public services than smaller cities, and expanding an existing
police force or sewerage facility is easier and cheaper than creating an
entirely new police force or facility. A service's excess capacity is also
a function (in part) of city size, and it can reduce the impacts of initial
population growth. In Texas, cities under 5,000 population must
wait until property owners petition for annexation whereas larger cities
may initiate the process themselves. Annexation of surrounding property
allows the city to expand both'its sales and property tax bases, which af-
fect not only its tax revenue but also its bonding capacity.
Population Growth Rate
Because of bonding and tax revenue limitations and delays, the popu-
lation growth rate in large part determines whether demands on public ser-
vices will increase faster than the localities can expand them. A moderate
growth rate notifies officials that services will soon need expansion, and
it leaves them ample time to do so. But a rapid growth rate exposes the
need for expansion almost at the same time it is needed. Unless a facility
has excess capacity, a rapid growth rate creates overutilized services and
high costs. For example, Mt. Pleasant's 3% annual increase in school en-
rollment first filled the excess capacity (caused by decreasing birth rates),
but the 13% enrollment increase in Pearsall immediately surpassed its excess
capacity and resulted in overcrowded classrooms.
53
Poor Public Management
Poor public management preceding the rapid influx of people often
means public services are poorly maintained, outdated, and barely adequate
for the long-time population. These services simply break down under the
additional strain imposed by rapid population growth. Expanding well-
maintained, modern facilities is easier, quicker, and cheaper than replac-
ing antiquated, poorly maintained services. During and following the boom,
the quality of public management also affects how quickly and effectively
cities can provide acceptable public services and can reduce the costs from
development. For example, before the oil boom, both Dilley and Pearsall
had poor police and fire services. These services are still inadequate in
Dilley, but Pearsall's managers have been able to correct them. Likewise,
Mt. Pleasant's manager effectively regulates commercial demands on some
services and thereby prevents further facility overutilization. Less
effective managers in other cities forget about reducing demand and therefore
the need to expand facilities.
Types of Energy Development
Different types of energy development produce different types of
rapid population growth and land use, both of which affect the severity
of local costs. Coal development's surface mines and supporting coal-fired
generating facilities disturb large tracts of land and disrupt ranching.
However, a coal-development project involves only a few companies, making
it easier for localities to predict population growth, to negotiate with
companies, and thus to decrease local costs. Petroleum developments in-
volve many small companies which makes it difficult for cities to ascertain
the number and expected arrival time of inmigrants. A larger portion of these
employees take temporary work than do lignite development workers. This tem-
porariness reduces chances for capital loans and discourages construction of
public facilities to serve the newcomers. Despite these pressures, which in-
crease local costs in oil boomtowns, oil development's minimal disturbance of
the land and its low visibility decrease local costs.
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Social Milieu
The local attitude toward growth and the existing social problems
influence the public's perceptions of energy development, which affects
their responses to it. Since many people perceive rapid population growth
as a blessing rather than a problem, they welcome it and avoid responses
which might discourage it. While this attitude reduces the frequency of men-
tal disorders and social conflict, it discourages cost-saving policies which
impose upon newcomers. Societal traditions of public involvement and of
acceptable social class behavior also affect the types of activities
people seriously consider. For example, middle and lower-income residents of
southwest Texas traditionally have left governing to the landed class, per-
petuating a type of paternal government prevalent in many rural towns;
their day-to-day approach to problems discourages participation in projects
requiring extensive public involvement. Existing social problems preoccupy
the public's attention and blind them to energy development impacts until
the costs reach severe proportions. These customs and preoccupations
create an inertia which precludes the active, aggressive public involvement
displayed in Mt. Pleasant.
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III. STATE RESPONSES TO LOCALIZED COSTS WROUGHT BY ENERGY DEVELOPMENT
Overview
The preceding discussion creates two images of energy development
in Texas: dispersed statewide benefits and localized costs. While
localities can partially alleviate these adverse impacts from rapid energy
development, much of this control rests with the state government. In
general, state officials' decisions on the use of this control progress
through five stages of questions and answers, which together form a
decision-tree helpful in analyzing their decisions (Figure 3). By using
this decision-tree to analyze responses by Texas officials to energy
development's local costs, we can infer not only the reasons behind their
responses but also the constraints that must be addressed before choosing
different responses.
Framework for Analysis
Question 1: Whose Needs do we Accomodate?
State governments exist to increase the welfare of all state
residents, but a decision-maker (DM)* cannot serve everyone's needs
equally and at any given time will assign some group higher priority than
another. For example, a government may claim to serve the "ordinary
citizen" when in reality it favors those with power and wealth. When
choosing a response to local costs, a DM first asks, "Should I serve the
general public, those with minimal power (Decision 1B), or some special
group with wealth or influence, such as those who in fact can perpetuate
my position (Decision lA)?" Those choosing 1A have little reason to
publicize their decision, but the long-term effects of their actions often
become indicators of their choice.
*"Decision-maker"refers to elected and appointed state officials, agencies,
and other governmental organizations. These decision-makers influence
either the direction of state policy or the implementation of state
programs and regulations.
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Question 2: Does Energy Development Impose
Local Costs or Suffering?
Assuming a DM chooses Decision 1B (ignoring for the moment
whether or not that interest is genuine or a "front" for a different
policy), then he must decide if local costs really exist. Two situations
could lead to a decision that no such costs exist (Decision 2A): (i) he
may not be aware of the costs, either because he has no source of
information about local conditions or because local people have not made
an issue of them; (ii) on the other hand, an official may see the changes
that are taking place without defining them as costs. The fact that some
people attend overcrowded schools may be viewed as a valueless phenomenon
(i.e., a conscious local choice) rather than as a cost. However, if the
DM recognizes and acknowledges costs and suffering (Decision 2B), he
proceeds to define these costs.
Question 3: What is the Nature of These Costs?
Once costs are recognized, a decision-maker categorizes them as
either significant (Decision 3A) or insignificant (Decision 3B).
Significant costs appear long-term and serious, whereas insignificant
costs are short-term or minimal, i.e., inconveniences that will disappear
in the near future without state government involvement. A DM might
define significant costs as insignificant if the welfare of those affected
is of little concern to him. Obviously, one's prejudices and ideologies
affect the classification given these local costs.
Question 4: Who is Responsible for Mitigating These Costs?
A variety of criteria can be used to assign responsibility for
mitigating costs. A legal interpretation of responsibility assigns it
according to some formal set of rules, such as a state constitution or set
of statutes; other rules reflect ideologies about government involvement.
A second criterion assigns responsibility to whomever can be blamed for
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creating the costs, and a third assigns responsibility to the actor with
the most efficient and effective solution.
Each criterion is used by some DM, and each has its shortcomings.
A criterion reflecting formal rules assumes a governmental structure
designed to handle previous situations will be appropriate for future
ones. A strictly ideological criterion can easily lose sight of the
major objective, in this case alleviating costs, in its adherence to
what is proper and improper for government to do. Assigning responsibility
according to blame is simplistic and can lead to problems in the long
run: it may be more efficient for government to absorb the program costs
than for a development company, especially if the costs act as
disincentives for future development, and it may be impossible to force
the "guilty party" to respond. Fault must be imputed whereas the costs
from energy development may result from normal operational procedures
rather than from a mistake or wrong behavior. Decisions based just on
efficiency and effectiveness overlook other, less quantifiable
considerations.
In assigning responsibility, a DM tends to balance a consideration
for efficiency and effectiveness against his perception of the role of
state government. A slight gain in efficiency probably would not justify
state involvement in an area generally considered private or local domain.
The group assigned responsibility decides what portion, if any, of the
costs will be ameliorated and by what means.
Insignificant costs usually do not warrant state involvement and
are assigned to local governments (Decision 4D) or to the private market
system (Decision 4C). If costs are defined as significant (Decision 3A),
then either the local (4A), federal (4G), or state (4B) government will be
considered responsible. When localities are considered responsible, state
regulations (or the lack thereof) may obstruct localities from managing
these costs (Decision 4E). Therefore the state may face a decision about
keeping (4Ei) or removing (4Eii) these obstructions. People perceiving
significant local costs may encourage the federal government to reduce
them (Decision 4G) for one of several reasons: (i) federal policy created
them, (ii) energy development benefits the nation and therefore the nation
is responsible, (iii) state governments "lack the resources" to reduce
costs, or (iv) the situation's complexity requires action by a higher
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level of government.
People might also request federal action without considering the
significance of the costs (Decision 4H). If federal resources are available,
some might think the state should participate in the program--just to get
its share--as long as it does not entail federal control over state and
local affairs. The federal government has depended on such responses
to implement some of its policies.
Question 5: If the State Has a Responsibility
What Action Should it Take?
If a decision assigns the state responsibility for mitigating
costs, then one must decide what action, if any, is in order. A DM
could decide not to act (5A) for several reasons: Mitigating the costs
may not be "worth it" (5Ai)--the correction process may be more costly,
either politically or financially than the original condition. In another
situation the solution may be available at the right price, but adopting it
may be impossible because of insurmountable political opposition (5Aii).
Thus "no action" may be an unavoidable rather than a prefered choice. A
lack of knowledge about which actions would help (5Aiii) may also be
reason for stasis.
A DM might assume no new programs are needed because existing
programs and regulations (created for other reasons) are sufficient (5B).
Rather than create a new program aimed specifically at mitigating local
costs of energy development--for example, overcrowded schools, overutilized
water system, inadequate health facilities, damaged natural environment--
he might assume existing programs aimed at a particular kind of cost (no
matter what its source) can sufficiently reduce the boomtown costs. For
example, assume a state has a program guaranteeing a certain level of
public education services. An official may decide no additional effort is
needed to reduce energy development's adverse impacts on local public
education. Such a symptomatic response, Decision 5B, may be piecemeal
and short-sighted. It ignores the situations creating the costs when
designing programs to mitigate them. Unless a state's social programs
address every type of cost experienced by boomtowns, this approach will be
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incomplete.
A DM might, however, recommend some new state action, aimed directly
at the local costs of energy development (5C). The action could be minimal,
involving only incremental changes in the current governmental system
(5Ci). If the structure appears deficient, state action could call for an
additional program or regulation designed specifically to mitigate boom-
town costs (5Cii). In other cases, the government structure may be so
unresponsive, ineffective, or inappropriate that mitigating costs requires
major structural changes in the basic system (5Ciii).
The decision tree described above represents the logical decision-
making process followed by state DM's when responding to some situation
that imposes both statewide benefits and local costs. In the following
pages we use this framework to analyze the reponses of Texas DM's to the
local costs from rapid energy development, in particular revealing how
their perception of the costs and the role of state government determine
the actions they take.
Texas' Responses to Local Costs
Texas state officials have no single perception of the local costs
from energy development. Some see no specifically local costs, while others
perceive significant costs worthy of a whole new state program. Their
responses to these costs-vary accordingly, from no action to creation of a
Coastal Management Program. The following analysis of responses made by
Texas officials reveals not only the types of responses chosen and the
reasons behind those decisions,,but also the reasons.certain responses have
not been made.
Decisions lA and 1B: Whose Needs Do We Accomodate?
The first decision, seldom verbalized, is whether to serve the
general public (1B) or the powerful (lA). Because it is a discreet
decision, we can only examine who appears to have been served in the long
run, an indicator of the actual choice.
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The analysis and data in hand do not allow us to "convict" Texas
officials of decision 1A nor to acquit them fully. Railroad Commissioner
Wallace's attitude toward secondary impacts from petroleum development
hints at an allegiance to the powerful, especially big business. If
people do not like what petroleum development does to their city, he thinks
they should leave. The Railroad Commission's Oil and Gas Division avoids
any policy which might be distasteful to petroleum developers. Governor
Briscoe's policies demonstrate allegiance to large landowners, at the
expense of the general public. His budgetary policies have made it more
difficult for state officials to maintain contact with localities.
Besides openly favoring the powerful interests, actions which
avoid problems created by these interests indicate the Dms favorable
disposition toward the powerful. In response to evidence of local problems,
the legislature is prone to fund studies, whose recommendations they ignore.
This response is consistent with a desire to give the appearance of "doing
something" when officials have no real intentions of addressing the
problem through real changes. Texas has also passed legislation without
appropriating money to implement it. The 1973 Coastal Public Lands
Management Act was funded only for a study. Agencies adopted Environmental
Impact State Guidelines [24] knowing they would have no staff to implement
them; the Guidelines have in fact been ignored almost completely.
Despite this evidence that at least some state officials prefer
serving the powerful to serving the general public, we cannot overlook
evidence to the contrary. The Surface Mining Division of the Railroad
Commission has not been afraid to vex large energy developers. Indeed,
the main opponent of its surface mining regulations has been Conoco, a
petroleum company responsible for most Texas uranium mines. Both the
General Land Office and the Attorney General's Office have reputations for
advocating the needs of the general public, especially those with little
power. While the Texas Air Quality Control Board shows a healthy respect
for private development incentives, its history of litigation shows that
it is not bashful about implementing air quality regulations. The recently
created Public Utilities Commission, long sought by liberals and
moderates in Texas, clearly advocates the consumers' interest.
In the following analysis we give Texas officials the benefit
of the doubt and assume their intentions are to serve the needs of the
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general public rather than the powerful and wealthy; the alternative
assumption cannot be supported without extensive research. However, the
reader should recognize that our assumption about Texas' behavior is an
operational one not adopted by many residents of the state of Texas.
Decisions 2A and 2B: Acknowledging Costs
Texas DMs tend to answer the second question in our model--do
costs exist--in the affirmative (2B). When pressed few will say that
energy development "imposes no local costs." However, after that point,
consensus disappears; people differ substantially in estimating the
significance of these costs.
Decisions 3B and 4D: Local Responsibility for
Insignificant Costs
Perceiving insignificant costs (33) manageable by local communities
(4D) follows a view held by many Texas residents before they actually
experience rapid energy development--that local costs will be minimal and
short-term in comparison to the benefits. DMs often have the same
perception. Once they define costs as insignificant, further decisions
about state responsibility disappear. Private developers could reduce
costs, but no one expects them to do so voluntarily. By process of
elimination, they shift responsibility to localities. These DMs tend to
believe that localities have sufficient tools to correct any problems or
short-term fiscal imbalances (4D). Communities claiming to suffer from
these impacts are assumed (i) to face temporary problems, (ii) to be lazy
or uncreative, or (iii) actually to prefer their new situation. These
common perceptions discourage state assistance to localities.
Railroad Commission representatives exemplify these views.
Commissioner Wallace sees no serious problems at the local level and
questions whether the state should alter its permitting process to
accomodate local needs. If people do not like the changes which
accompany oil development, this Commissioner feels they should move, since
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they have the freedom to live anywhere they want. People complaining of
energy development impacts have chosen that particular community, problems
and all. Staff members are less severe in their judgements; at least one
recognizes that places like Pearsall and Dilley have serious problems,
through no fault of their own. But he views these situations as the
exception rather than the rule, not warranting adjustment in Railroad
Commission permitting policy.
Several officials in other agencies recognize local costs, but
they differentiate the Texas experience from those inother energy develop-
ment states. The frequently made comment, "Texas doesn't really have
boomtown problems like the Western states do," reflects their relegation
of Texas local costs to insignificant proportions. Recognition that
Texas might face significant local costs in the future does not justify,
in their minds, state preventive action now.
Decisions 3A and 4A: Local Responsibility
for Significant Costs
Other state officials (and especially local officials) believe
that energy development imposes significant local costs (3A), but that
localities can manage them (4A). Two reasons underlie the decision that
costs are significant. In some cases, benefits expected to accompany
energy development do not appear on schedule. Localities anticipating
temporary and minimal costs suddenly realize "temporary" may become
permanent and "minimal" exceed the costs borne before the boom. Second,
they also notice that the phenomenon of net costs is not unique to their
locality, but that other energy development towns face a similar situation.
Despite their recognition of the issue's breadth, many officials
still assign responsibility to localities. The criterion for this
decision is mostly ideological, i.e., that providing public services and
controlling land use are local powers. Protecting this division between
state and local power is an important political constraint in Texas.
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Decisions 4F and 4E: State Obstructions
to Local Costs
A portion of those assigning localities responsibility for
reducing these costs believe local governments currently have ample
power to do so--they perceive no state obstructions to effective local
control (4F). Rather than point to state obstruction of local efforts,
they point to local reluctance to act. Several officials would condition
any state assistance on evidence that localities have tried every means
available for mitigating these costs. This decision reflects the
assumption that state government responsiblity begins only when local
governments cannot act. It also assumes significant problems are
manageable by local governments and that their existence means local
governments have chosen not to act.
Other DMs come to a different conclusion: no matter how
extensive local governments' efforts to improve public services and to
retard the growth rate of local costs, state enabling legislation
restricts local options for managing their own affairs (4E). Counties
have almost no power over development that eventually affects county
costs. They lack ordinance-making powers, except for specific problems,
i.e., implementing flood plain management, licensing private sewerage
facilities, and zoning land around airports. (Additional zoning powers
have sometimes been authorized on a county-by-county basis in response
to particular problems; three counties may zone property around two
state recreation areas and counties near astronomical observatories may
regulate outdoor lighting. [64]) Annexation regulations restrict cities
from expanding their tax base, and bonding requirements limit their
ability to raise capital for expanding public service facilities. State
procedures and regulations also increase the time it takes for cities to
receive property and sales tax revenues.
Several current legislative proposals would remove part of these
obstructions (4Eii). Although the pressure behind these recommendations
did not grow out of the boomtown experience, people concerned about local
effectiveness in reducing boomtown costs support them. Proposed House
Bill 179 (1977) would provide counties with optional ordinance making
powers and proposed Senate Bill 171 (1977) would allow cities to extend
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their building codes into their extraterritorial jurisdictions. The
county ordinance making bill started with broad ordinance powers; but
by the time it left its committees, few were left [55]. Other proposals
would relax annexation requirements, permitting all cities of 1,500
population or more to initiate annexation procedures [56].
Other people would rather see these obstructions to local power
stay in place (4Ei). The real estate lobby (the Texas Association of
Realtors), ranchers, and large landowners see these proposed expansions
of county and local powers as threats to private property rights. They
argue that counties have all the regulatory power they need, noting the
specific powers given selective counties to meet particular problems.
Rather than give all counties the same power, they prefer allocating
power on a case-by-case basis, as the specific need arose. In this manner
counties receive no more control over private property than absolutely
needed. It is not their concern that counties be left with too little
power.
While localities can help minimize local costs, without assistance
they cannot effectively reduce significant costs to the level desired.
Current proposals have not addressed all of the state-imposed obstructions
facing localities; even without these obstructions it is doubtful that
strictly local actions can ameliorate these costs.
Decisions 4G and 4H: Federal Responsibility to Boomtowns
Texans rarely assign the federal government responsibility for
reducing local costs (4G). Most people interviewed want federal assistance
only after both local and state efforts have proved inadequate. They fear
federal controls might accompany federal assistance. The few who have
recommended federal assistance in reducing these costs are impressed that
"the money is there" (4H). For example, the only reference to local public
service costs found in the policy paper adopted by the Governor's Energy
Advisory Council reads as follows:
It is recommended . . . that revenue sharing should be made available
to the adjoining coastal states to aid in offsetting the costs of
required public services and environmental costs. [57]
This recommendation evolved out of the awareness that communities impacted
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by the development of federal coal leases receive financial assistance to
mitigate local costs, therefore so should communities affected by federal
OCS development. But nothing else in this policy paper even implies that
the Energy Advisory Council believes local communities suffer significant
costs from energy development.
Decision 5A: No State Action
Some officials recognize significant costs from energy development
(3A), and the state's responsibility to mitigate those costs (4B), but
they choose not to act (5A). People frequently fear that state efforts
to mitigate these costs will discourage development of energy resources,
thus creating net costs for the state. In this view, consideration for
local social and economic impacts will destroy the benefits received
from energy development. Commissioner Wallace maintains that people in
Texas recognize their economic dependence on petroleum production and will
not "bite the hand that feeds them," i.e., by being concerned with
secondary impacts from drilling activities. The Railroad Commission,
the Air Quality Control Board, and the Governor's Energy Advisory
Council have made it plain that their policies will not dampen private
development incentives.
For a different reason other officials also have decided not to
act. They believe the state should take some action, but they realize
influential people perceive such action as a disincentive to development
and therefore will veto it. Proposing the necessary action would create
insurmountable political friction. The story behind the proposed Coastal
Management Program reflects this kind of reasoning. The consultants
preparing that program believe the state should help reduce the social and
economic costs imposed by offshore petroleum development. Yet their
proposed program makes no provisions for such assistance. When asked why
the program addresses only physical environmental conditions, a spokesman
pointed out that specifying social and economic impacts amelioration
would have been political suicide for the proposal and therefore was
excluded. However, the program's structure allovs addition of those
concerns at a later date, if Texas officials desire to include them.
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A third reason for choosing inaction is a lack of knowledge about
the most appropriate response. Studying "the problem" may reveal the
appropriate action but does not imply that any action will be taken. This
type of inaction occurs frequently in Texas: over the last ten years about
$120 million has been spent to study coastal management problems but the
proposed Coastal Management Program includes more analysis of coastal
problems [2].
No matter which reason they use, these DMs know that significant
costs exist and that the state is responsible for minimizing them but
has previously chosen not to. When they choose inaction, these DMs
realize that costs will not be mitigated at all.
Decision 5B: No New State Action
Another decision (5B) also leads to no new programs but assumes
state action will occur through existing programs and regulations. An
official may assume current state programs and regulations will effectively
minimize local costs and therefore will fulfill the state's responsibility
to do so. Costs not affected by these programs are by implication
insignificant or the responsiblity of local government.
These existing programs were not designed to reduce local costs
from energy development, but they happen to do so. State assistance was
designed to help all localities provide a minimal level of services;
boomtowns can take advantage of these services like any other community.
Other programs and regulations were designed to minimize statewide
environmental costs from various types of developments, and some reduce
local costs in the process.
In Texas a decision to channel future state action through
existing programs and regulations reflects a high value on minimal state
involvement in local and private affairs. The degree to which state
government will assist (and therefore interfere with) local provision
of services has previously been defined; boomtowns requiring greater
assistance are simply out of luck. The ideological limits to state
involvement take precedence over efficiency and effectiveness. The
underlying objective appears to be providing a certain level of state
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assistance rather than guaranteeing a given quality of public service.
Existing Local Assistance Programs
There are three types of local assistance programs in Texas
which DMs point to as fulfilling the state's responsibility to mitigate
significant local costs. One type (Foundation School Przgram) subsidizes
local operating costs in order to guarantee a minimal level of a public
service. Another (Water Development Fund, Rural Industrial Development
Fund) provides low-interest loans for financing capital improvements.
These loan programs require state funds initially but expect to be self-
supporting eventually. A third program category (Department of Community
Affairs, Councils of Governments, Texas Parks and Wildlife Department)
facilitate local acquisition of federal funds and require state funds only
for program operating costs. The DM choosing "no new action" believes
these assistance programs minimize local costs, but the following
analysis of these programs demonstrates their inability to do so.
i. Subsidizing operating costs
Only one state program, the Foundation School Program operated
through the Texas Education Agency (TEA), subsidizes public service
operating expenses incurred by localities. DMs adopting Decision 5B
assume the state has no responsiblity (i) to subsidize public education
beyond the amount this program provides or (ii) to guarantee a minimal
level for any other public services. Implicit in Decision 5B is the
assumption that communities can provide "basic education" by combining
this subsidy and local resources.
Each school district pays 35, per $100 of real market value;
the state pays the difference between this figure and each district's
Foundation School Program cost, the operating expenses estimated from
the previous year's average daily attendance. When funds are available,
as they have been for the past several years, the TEA can make two of the
ten monthly paymentsin September, giving schools some help with large
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initial expenditures.*
The TEA does not aid schools with capital improvements, since such
assistance is often perceived as encouraging state control over local
affairs. Subsidizing operating expenses may help boomtowns in the long-run,
but it ignores the serious costs imposed by overcrowded and outdated school
facilities.
ii. Capital assistance loans
Recognizing the difficulties energy boomtowns have in financing
new or expanded capital facilities, a DM may assume the current loan
programs respond to localities' immediate capital needs and reduce their
long-term costs from constructing new facilities. The Water Development
Fund provides low-interest capital loans for expanding the local water
capacity; the Rural Industrial Development Fund loans part of the cost of
constructing an industrial park.
However, because of conservative fiscal policies, neither of
these programs have effectively reduced local costs from energy development.
Although the Water Development Fund was created to aid small communities
experiencing financial hardship** [42, 43], it cannot assist financially
unstable communities. The Texas Constitution restricts the Fund's
allocation to local funds "certified to be available" [44]. As the Board
has stated:
The possibility of the State of Texas emulating the City of New
York by indiscriminate and irresponsible issuance of State
supported debt is extremely remote, if not impossible. Additional
bonds will be issued only after the need is aptly demonstrated to
our highly qualified six-member citizen board [45].
In the interest of all state taxpayers, the Board is extremely hesitant
to extend funds to financially unstable communities. They review a
community's long-term ability to repay loans; those with large temporary
populations, such as oil drilling areas, and with no guarantee of future
*When a district's enrollment is greater than expected, the TEA will
recalculate its payments and make reimbursements at the end of the year.
**The Fund was designed to be self supporting (through repaid loans) by
the 1990s,: and to date has needed only $29.4 million in general state
revenue to cover debt service [44].
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permanent jstries are considered a bad credit risk.* Since 1972 the
demand for this financial assistance has increased dramatically, thus
increasing boomtowns' competition and reducing their probability of
funding.
The Rural Industrial Development Fund [39] has had even less
impact on local costs from energy development. A similarly conservative
loan policy, minimal funds,** and stiff competition from more stable
communities has made it difficult for energy development localities to
receive funding.
iii. Local self-help programs
A DM choosing response 5B assumes the state has little responsibility for
any local costs not mitigated through education subsidies or local loan
programs; programs helping communities find other resources fulfill this
responsibility. Since most of these "other resources" are federally
funded, Texas finances only the state agencies' operating costs.
The services provided through the Department of Community Affairs
(DCA) provide the best example of this approach to reducing local costs.
Created as a clearinghouse for federal community programs, the DCA helps
Texas communities receive their "share" of federal financial assistance,
at minimal cost to the state. It helps communities discover and apply for
federal funds and provides assistance only (i) when problems cannot be
"totally solved with local resources," (ii) when they do not "fit" other
aid programs, and (iii) when either local communities request assistance
or federal programs require it. Any initiative for new programming must
come from either the Governor or the Legislature [47].
DCA provides no special services to energy impacted communities;
indeed, the staff assumes local costs are insignificant and manageable
by the private market: they reason that energy developments are close to
*By August, 1976, $228,793,804 of the available $400,000,000 had been
committed for 88 projects, 80 percent of which smaller communities have
received.
**The 1973 Legislature allocated only $600,000 (permitting only six loans),
but the 1977 Legislature's proposed budget includes a $2 million per year
allocation for this biennium.
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urban centers that can provide needed services for rural areas,
including private housing. The DCA sees no reason for state government
involvement unless basic public services are severely threatened and they
do not believe energy development can induce such conditions in Texas.
Other local self-help programs have a similarly small impact
on energy development communities. The Parks and Wildlife Department
sets priorities for distributing federal recreation funds [40, 41];
communities with large temporary populations and unstable fiscal conditions
receive low priority. The Councils of Governments "publicize" federal
programs and provide planning assistance but cannot effectively help
communities reduce the serious local costs. The Texas Industrial Commission
teaches localities how to attract new industries, but they only work with
communities that actively participate. Certain types of energy development
communities have difficulty making this commitment, given the many other
problems demanding their attention.
These six programs represent the state's total effort to directly
help localities provide services. For many decades the state has supported
education in Texas, seen as an investment in the state's future development.
The Rural Industrial Development Fund was justified by a similar rationale.
State aid for water development projects was accepted only after localities
suffered serious water shortages. Since many service costs experienced
by boomtowns are neither frequent in other types of communities nor
considered a threat to the state's future development, it is unlikely that
the state will create special local assistance programs to reduce these
costs. Therefore, this approach to reducing local costs will probably
continue to be piecemeal and inadequate.
Environmental Regulations
DMs cho.osing no new state action assume the previously discussed
assistance programs will reduce social costs after or as they appear;
they further assume the existing environmental regulations will prevent
local costs involving damages to the physical environment. Taken.
together, these two types of state action are expected to meet Texas'
responsiblity to mitigate local costs from energy development.
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These regulations fall into two categories: Regulations of
mineral exploration and production prevent it from damaging the land,
air, and water. Other regulations prevent mineral processing and
supporting activities from damaging natural resources. Although DMs
choosing response 5B assume these regulations sufficiently remove energy
development's threat to the environment, including local environmental
costs, the following discussion reveals shortcomings in these
regulations that permit increaseszin local environmental and financial
costs.
i. Mineral Exploration and Production
The Railroad Commission regulates petroleum activites on private
leases, and the General Land Office does the same for state-owned leases.
Despite the General Land Office's role, the immense power of the Railroad
Commission means they effectively set the tone for petroleum production
regulation in Texas.
Since 1919 the Oil and Gas division of the Railroad Commission
has regulated drilling and extraction of petroleum resources, and since
1965 it has prevented pollution from drilling activities [26, 58]. Its
main focus is maximizing long-term petroleum production while preventing
water pollution 126], which it accomplishes by issuing drilling permits
and by regulating drilling procedures, the discharge of water during
drilling operations, and the rate of petroleum extraction.
Although the Railroad Commission effectively implements its
specific conservation instructions, its regulatory activities do not
address all types of natural resource damage done by petroleum production,
to say nothing of the social and economic costs created. The Oil and Gas
Division strictly regulates oil and gas developments and prevents
water pollution from these operations; other implications from these
activities do not concern them. For example, Young of the Oil and Gas
Division recognizes that oil drilling, especially secondary recovery,
consumes large quantities of already scarce groundwater in west Texas.
The conflict over water exists, but the Railroad Commission has taken
no steps to minimize this conflict. Their permitting policies could
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consider drilling's impact on groundwater supplies, but the Railroad
Commission will not venture beyond its prescribed responsiblities. When
granting permits, the Commission views the state as a featureless plain,
noting only the location of other wells and the mineral reserves. It
shows no concern for petroleum's social and economic impacts at the local
level.
The Railroad Commission regulates lignite, coal, and uranium
mining through its Surface Mining and Reclamation Division. This new
division (started in 1975) enforces standards for land reclamation and
related water pollution by registering exploration activities, issuing
mining permits, and inspecting mines. A Performance Bond, provided by
permit applicants, equals the total cost of reclaiming the proposed mine
and will be used for reclamation should an operation fail to comply with
the state's standards [29]. All but one lignite mine have already conformed
to standards, but uranium mine operators have generally resisted pressures
to reclaim open-pit mines. All nonconforming mines are facing court-
ordered compliance.
Despite their success in preventing environmental damage from
surface mining, these regulations overlook other types of environmental
costs. They deny mining permits where they would endanger surface water
and clean air, but they do not deny them for endangering the supply of
groundwater [31] or the availability of land for food production. The
Division does not consider mining's full implications, including secondary
impacts, for host communities. Indeed, a spokesman doubts that mining
in Texas creates any significant second-order impacts.
ii. Regulating Mineral Processing and Supporting Activities
The DMs depending on existing programs and regulations assume the
Railroad Commission's activities effectively prevent environmental damages
from energy production; additional regulations are expected to do the
same for mineral processing and its supporting activities. These
regulations, designed to prevent water and air pollution, may reduce local
costs imposed by environmental damages, but they may actually increase
financial cost for localities.
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Three state agencies regulate local water supplies. The Water
Quality Board sets water pollution standards and implements a statewide
water quality control program. If adhered to, these standards prevent
costs from water pollution, but the Board cannot assist communities in
maintaining these standards. They have no influence over distribution of
state assistance funds--they can only force communities to comply with
standards, at whatever costs. The Water Rights Commission may settle
conflicts over rights to surface water, but it has little opportunity
to minimize localized costs. It can help protect a locality's source of
surface water, but it has no control over groundwater, the major supply
of water in oil development areas.
Water Conservation and Subsidence Districts are the only
governmental bodies with the authority to control the spacing of water
wells and the water extraction rates [28]. They may regulate water
extraction in order to prevent waste, to protect water reserves, or to
prevent subsidence, but they have no mandate to establish priorities among
users.
Although they have not been used for this purpose, the district's
conservation measures could reduce local costs from energy development.
In Southwest Texas, the water extraction rate exceeded the recharge rate
before the recent oil development began. Since oil development (especially
secondary recovery) requires substantial amounts of water, it has
accelerated the decline of local water supplies, which increases costs for
agriculture, ranching, and residential users.* Water districts could
slow the extraction rate, but to date these powers have not been used in
this way within oil development areas.
The Air Quality Control Board restricts emission of particulates,
sulfur compounds, toxic materials, volatile carbon Compounds, and nitrogen
compounds. It will not permit facility construction or operation if it
(i) is expected to cause significant deterioration of existing ambient
air quality; (ii) is located without "proper" consideration of current
land use; or (iii) fails to use the best control technology available.
Industries have learned, over the past eight years, that the Air Quality
*A lower water table means increased pumping and treatment costs, and
could mean drilling new wells.
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Control Board means business. They firmly enforce regulations they
consider crucial to Texas air quality [37, 38].
Some Texas officials sense enforcement of air quality regulations
could deter energy development, but the Board's staff has made it clear
that their policies will not do so. Specifically, officials fear that
substituting lignite for natural gas in electricity generation will
conflict with the SO2, particulate emission, and "significant deterioration"
standards. But staff members of the Air Quality Control Board maintain
that this fear is unfounded and that the threat has been exaggerated.
While boiler conversion could present problems along the Texas coast, they
doubt it would in other parts of Texas. Requirements for "the best
available control technology" on new facilities is conditioned on the
"economic reasonableness" of investing in such equipment [38]. The
Board will not strictly enforce particulate or ozone standards in the
near future; neither will they enforce EPA's hydrocarbon standards since
strict enforcement would mean a serious reduction of economic activities
in almost all areas of the state.
DMs depending on existing programs and regulations to reduce local
costs from energy development may be satisfied with the results: minimal
financial assistance, extensive and easily accessible local self-help
programs, effective prevention of most first-order environmental damages,
minimal prevention of second-order environmental damages. These state
actions may address all those costs a DM considers significant and within
the state's responsiblity. However, if a DM has a serious commitment
to reduce local costs from energy development, he probably will consider
new state action to ameliorate these costs.
Decision 5C: New State Action
Decision 5Ci: Incremental Change
Some DMs have decided these existing programs and regulations
do not mitigate the significant local costs from energy development and
that some new state action is in order. Their proposals do not add
another "layer" (i.e., programs, regulations) to government, but just
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make small adjustments in the current structure and procedures (Decision
5Ci). In Texas, these incremental changes usually mean (i) increased
coordination of existing agencies or (ii) expansion of existing offices
or their budgets.
Previous decisions to coordinate the actions of existing agencies
have not been aimed at reducing local costs, but they provide insight
into the implementation of such an approach in Texas.
i. The Need for Incremental Change
By the mid-1960s legislators realized that the state government's
structure precluded effective state policy implementation. Indeed, that
was the objective of the structural design in the first place. The
Governor has limited power. He appoints most commissioners and agency
heads, but (with one exception) he cannot remove them from office. The
Lieutenant Governor appoints all the legislative committees, serves as
President of the Senate, and competes with the Governor for political
power. Four popularly elected Commissioners serve within the executive
branch although they are politically independent of the Governor.
The Commissions and agencies face few incentives to coordinate their
efforts with any other office:
[E]ach agency was formed to respond to a particular need and
tends to operate within its legislative or constitutional statement
of purpose. . . . State agencies are very autonomous, they obtain
their appropriations from the Legislature, and it is the Legislature
and their governing boards they must answer to--not the Governor
[64].
To correct for the agencies' provincial and narrow perception, the
legislature has designed several interagency coordinating offices to
facilitate cooperation and consistency.
ii. Early Effects of Increased Coordination
In 1965 the Planning Agency Council for Texas (PACT) was created
within the Governor's office to review, coordinate, and unify state
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improvement projects (i.e., water supply, parks, transportation). In 1967
it was replaced by the Division of Planning Coordination and four interagency
councils formed along functional lines [23]. The Division was responsible
for strengthening state policy-making, advocating natural and human resource
concerns, coordinating state agencies, and supporting the interagency
councils. Unfortunately, this office could not implement policies--depen-
dence on the voluntary cooperation of state agencies and legislators
limited its effectiveness.
iii. Interagency Council on Natural Resources and the
Environment (ICNRE)
One of these four interagency councils was the Interagency Council
on Natural Resources and the Environment (ICNRE). Its implementation
problems contain a lesson for DMs proposing some incremental change as a
method for mitigating local costs. The ICNRE sponsored the first action
aimed specifically at mitigating local costs from energy developments--
Environmental Impact Statement Guidelines [24]. (While the action did not
address energy developmert per se, it specifically addressed secondary
impacts.) The document outlined procedures for member agencies to use
when reviewing permit applications. Each signatory agency agreed to use
these or similar procedures in assessing the permit applications they
received, but the Guidelines have been almost completely ignored and the
ICNRE has no power to implement it.
Two characteristics of the document spelled its failure. First,
the document is voluntary, a prerequisite for its adoption. Agencies
carefully guard their independence from centralized state authority and
avoid adopting any procedures threatening their power. Second, the
ideologies expressed in this document differ from those expressed by most
agency procedural rules. It stresses the importance of a "systems
approach" that coordinates individual agency decisions and assesses their
total and long term impact, whereas most agency permitting procedures
consider only primary impacts. Its ideologies parallel those of the
former Texas governor (in office when it was prepared) but not its
current governor. His support would have encouraged implementation.
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No public outcry demanded environmental impact statements, so legislators
felt little pressure to support it. Permitting agency staff are still often
unaware of the document and seemed to doubt the value of requesting
information on second-order impacts as part of their permitting procedures.
iv. The Governor's Energy Advisory Council
A previous decision involving incremental change created the
Governor's Energy Advisory Council in 1973. Despite its mandate to create
a coherent state energy policy, it has not considered energy development's
impacts on localities and has concentrated on more aggregate production
and demand questions.
By executive order in 1973, Governor Briscoe created an Energy
Advisory Council to advise him on energy-related matters and to administer
energy-related research contracts. The Energy Policy Planning Act of
1975 (Senate Bill 519) established the Council legislatively and
authorized it to conduct energy-related research, to advise the Governor,
and to prepare an energy policy for consideration of the Legislature.
The EAC maintians contact with energy companies, informs legislators of
current technologies, and reviews energy-related legislation when asked,
but it has not suggested comprehensive policies, prepared legislation,
or endorsed legislation.
Because of the Council's dependence on the Governor and other
agency heads, the staff has not been able to consider local costs from
energy development. Their explicit opinions clearly reflect the prevalent
ideologies of influential DMs: (i) an unincumbered private market system
can "solve" most energy problems; (ii) energy development in rural
areas causes few serious local problems; (iii) local governments can manage
these problems; and (iv) the state has no additional responsibility to
these communities because they are getting rich from energy development.
Their recently adopted recommendations reflect this preference
for accelerated energy development 122]. As chairman of the EAC, the
Governor calls its meetings and sets the tone for its work.
To date, these attempts at incremental change within the Texas
government have not effectively coordinated government policy, much less
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reduced local costs from energy development. Two conditions in particular
have caused their failure. First, individual agencies are powerful and
independent and they will not willingly relinquish that independence to
centralized authoirty. Second, these incremental changes have depended
on agency cooperation and the Governor's leadership. The previous Governor
politically supported coordinating activities, but Governor Briscoe has
undermined their ability to operate effectively and has discouraged any
movement toward coordinated policy-making. The success of this approach
to mitigating localized costs depends on the attitude and ideology of the
current governor and agency heads.
v. Proposed Coastal Management Program
The proposed Coastal Management Program represents a new attempt
to reduce local costs through incremental changes in government
procedures. Although its title implies a new program, it actually
involves an incremental change that increases inter-agency coordination.
In response to the 1972 Coastal Zone Management Act, the Texas
Legislature authorized the General Land Office to develop a coastal zone
management program [62].
Political support for this authorization rested on three
conditions: (i) it involved public lands managed for the long-term benefit
of Texas public schools; (ii) minimal private developments operate
specifically on public lands; (iii) federal matching dollars were then
available with an approved state coastal management program. Besides this
authorization, other aspects of the legislation increased regulation of
activities on coastal lands, but appropriations covered only the coastal
program's preparation.
Under contract with the General Land Office, Research and Planning
Consultants (RPC) of Austin began developing this program. It started
as a new program, but the development process whittled away all but incre-
mental changes in current procedures. The process, a "bottom-up" approach
to planning, used eighteen public hearings and fifteen regional workshops
to ascertain public limitations on state controls. A forty-one person
advisory committee representing otherwise incompatable political forces
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participated in a consensus-building process that produced the strongest
controls politically acceptable [46]. Many environmentalists and some
state officials preferred a new program with stronger state controls, but
political reality allowed only these incremental changes.
The program provides for (i) an organized information system,
(ii) procedures for assessing impacts from planned activities, and (iii)
an interagency council, the Natural Resources Council, to replace the
existing Interagency Council on Natural Resources and the Environment [36].
Several characteristics of the bills comprising the program have
appeased those forces--real estate, ranching, and big business--usually
opposing stronger state controls. It imposes no additional regulations,
requirements, or site-specific criteria for operating in the coastal zone.
Any regulatory changes would evolve through agency coordination within
the Natural Resources Council. In other words, the program provides the
structure and information needed to improve the management of coastal
areas but does not specify improvements. The General Land Commissioner
Bob Armstrong portrays the proposed Coastal Management Program in these
words:
The program is a product from the people; not from the politician
down. It is not a no-growth program. It is a "how we'll grow"
program. -It is not a "more government" program. It is a better
and more effective government program, using existing structures
[2].
His apologia touches on three common sources of opposition to new state
government programs.
Decision 5Cii: Creating New Programs
A DM in Texas should choose the creation of new programs (Decision
5Cii). with caution. New programs have not been adopted to mitigate local
costs from energy development. Resistance to expanded state government
makes this option unwise politically--unless incremental changes in the
existing procedures have already proved ineffecitve. A DM wanting to
create new programs for mitigating local costs should pay attention to the
characteristics and political histories of recently implemented new
programs. An analysis of these programs and their supporting rationales
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reveals six areas of concern to Texas lawmakers.
i. Local Subsidy/Fiscal Stability
Financial assistance to localities derive from self-supporting funds
(Water Development Fund; Rural Industrial Development Fund) that only
temporarily draw on state general revenue. Operating cost subsidies are
favored over capital subsidies because the former involve only short-term
commitments of state funds.
ii. Consideration for Other States
One condition encouraging political support for the recent
surface mining legislation was the realization that other major coal
producing states already regulated surface mining; without comparable
regulations, Texas would be vulnerable to companies reducing operating
costs by permanently destroying the long-term value of the surface land.
iii. Threat of Federal Intervention
Adoption of water quality regulations was independent of any
federal pressure, but both air quality controls and surface mining
regulations were adopted, at least in part, as a repsonse to threatened
federal intervention.
iv. Private Property Rights
Whenever possible proposed new programs should avoid state take-
over of private property rights. Both the Water Conservation Districts
and the Water Rights Commission were created to mitigate otherwise
unresolvable conflicts over property rights. These state interferences
with private property rights were justified because private entities could
not settle the conflicts without state intervention. Surface mining
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regulations deviate from this previous trend of limited state inter-
ference. These regulations were designed to protect the future value
of surface property, i.e., the state's non-renewable resources, even if
that property is privately owned.
v. Local Control
To the extent possible, efforts to mitigate local costs should
minimize state interference with local control; such interference is
justified when localities have proved ineffective in managing a task.
Water Conservation Districts avoid state interference by only allowing
localities to initiate creation of these districts. During the hearings
for the surface mining regulation, the most pervasive type of mining
(sand and gravel) was removed because it would affect almost all Texas
localities and was seen as excessive interference with local affairs.
Justification for a Public Utilities Commission was based on the
realization that (i) consumers have a right to quality utility services
and (ii) municipalities have failed to provide it without state
intervention. The Public Utilities Commission may force municipalities
to effectively regulate the quality of municipal utilities according
to established state standards [32].
vi. Effect on the Private Enterprises
Programs interfering with private enterprises are justified only
when the private sector has damaged a highly valued state resource.
Regulations of petroleum extraction guarantee maximum production from
Texas petroleum fields; without such regulations, owners may maximize
current profits by extracting oil and gas at high but suboptimal rates.
Air and water quality standards prevent people from destroying these
natural resources; without such regulations, people will dispose wastes
through the least costly (and most polluting) methods. The Public Utilities
Commission determines when it is necessary for utility companies to expand
their generating capacity; without such controls, utility companies have
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little incentive to act in the best interest of consumers, since they do
not face rate competition from other companies.
There is no absolute limit for any of these political constraints.
An action's perceived costs will be balanced against its expected benefits
and against the probable costs occurring without the action. The importance
of each constraint also changes over time as people adjust their perceptions
of the costs and of state government's role in reducing them. However,
a DM should consider these constraints when designing a new program.
Decision 5Ciii: Major Structural Changes in State Government
These six political constraints are even more important when a DM
proposes a structural change in state government operation. Indeed, major
structural changes are seldom proposed in Texas because they are so
difficult to implement. Texas officials have proposed none for mitigating
local costs, but the story of two recent (and unsuccessful) attempts
exemplify the type of resistance expected for this type of change.
The proposed 1971 Land Use Management Bill attempted to give
statewide land use control to the Texas Land Commissioner [63]. A newly
created Land Use Management Division would have prepared a land inventory
and development plan. Subject to public hearings and the Governor's
approval, the Regional Planning Commissions would have implemented the plan
with restricted powers to zone unincorporated areas.
The same forces traditionally opposing county zoning power--the
real estate lobby, large landowners, and ranchers--spelled defeat for
this bill. They perceived the provisions as excessive and unnecessary
interference with private property rights and local affairs. Despite the
governor's support large landowners and the real estate interests still
maintained effective control.
Another state land use bill, the Texas Land Resource Act of 1973
(Senate Bill 645), was defeated by the real estate, agriculture, and
ranching lobbies. Similar to the 1971 Land Use Management Bill it provided
for a land resources inventory and a development plan, but a newly
created Land Resource Commission would have implemented it. The bill puts
no specific limits on the state's power, and permits local review of the
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Plan after it has been written. Proponents of the bill assumed the
proposed National Land Use Policy Act would pass and therefore Texas
needed state controls to prevent federal intervention. The federal
threat was too weak to justify this structural change in state/local/
private relations.
Major structural changes aimed at mitigating local costs from
energy development will probably face similar types of opposition. Efforts
to strengthen and centralize state control over energy development will
conflict with thoseianving vested interests in the current system--i.e.,
real estate interests and large landowners. Increased power in a centra-
lized. office will mean decreased power either within the agencies or
within the local governments. Attempts to take power from either agencies
or localities will meet resistance, as did the proposed land use bills.
While the current government structure in Texas does not effectively
respond to local needs, entrenched political power almost guarantees it
will stay this way.
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IV. CONCLUSION
Although decisions by Texas officials follow no single path of
our decision model, there is a trend toward adoption of new programs, as
evidenced by the environmental programs created in the 1960s and 1970s
and by the addition of the Public Utilities Commission in 1975. While
the environmental programs were partially a response to threatened
federal intervention, the Public Utilities Commission was solely a
response to local pressure to "do something about inadequate servies"
in the state. Imposing incremental changes through interagency councils
has recently become a common response. The proposed Natural Resources
Council attempts to strengthen this approach, but some groups believe
incremental changes will never be satisfactory and should be abandoned in
favor of a new layer of decision-making.
The time is ripe for more centralized controls through creation
of new programs, but we expect no rapid move in that direction- especially
for new programs ameliorating local costs. The conservative "no government"
forces still have substantial influence, and anti-"welfare" attitudes
are still quite strong, reinforcing a reluctance to create any more "give
away" programs than are absolutely necessary. Local problems are often
perceived as a fact of life not worthy of government intervention. However,
the increasing concern for consumers and for social welfare compete with
these restraining attitudes. Recently approved state regulation of
utility services represents the attitude that the state should guarantee
consumers a basic quality of local public services. A new breed of
politicians, with slight but increasing influence, combine fiscal
conservatism with a concern for "the little people," but their rise to
power will be neither easy nor instant.
Several politicians representing this new power group believe
energy development and concerns for local impacts can peacefully coexist,
i.e., that the state can further regulate energy companies without
repelling them. This conclusion assumes (i) energy development industries
are not crucial to Texas' furture economic health; (ii) demanding more of
them will not necessarily damage energy development. The General Land
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Commissioner has publicly pointed out that the Texas economy depends
equally on Texas tourism, fishing, and agriculture industries. The
state should not overlook the impact of energy development on these
industries; the petroleum industry may require restraint in order to
protect these others. Since Texas has a strong locational advantage for
energy industries, it need not treat them so delicately. Further demands
(within reason) will neither drive them away nor discourage other industries
from locating in Texas. The rationale supporting the proposed refinery
tax makes these very claims and recent experiences with surface mining
regulation reinforce this belief.
It seems obvious that the state can make further demands on
energy industries without seriously damaging the state's economy, but
influential political leaders refuse to consider proposed demands or
regulations on energy industries. These political leaders are dispersed
throughout each level of state government, making it difficult to affect
their influence. Within the executive branch, the current governor and
several powerful agencies, such as the Railroad Commission and the Texas
Parks and Wildlife Department discourage political consideration of the
local costs from energy. Other executive agencies, such as the General
Land Office, the Attorney General's Office, and the Texas Industrial
Commission, show more concern. The Senate contains the strongest support
for natural resource protections, such as the surface mining legislation,
but it hosts the strongest opposition to county ordinance-making power.
The House of Representatives generally displays a stronger concern for
local control--explaining their support for proposed county powers and
their resistance to increased state power--even when local control hurts
localities. Conservative leadership in the House of Representatives
discourages additional regulation of energy industries.
The traditionally influential politician in Texas--with interests
in big business, ranching, large land-holdings--appears to serve those
interests by avoiding consideration of local costs and conditions among
localitites. The newer political forces--younger, politically sophisticated
professionals and independent businessmen-show more sensitivity to those
not endowed with large land holdings and wealth. A difference from
previous generations of Texas liberals is this new type of politician's
ability to survive.
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The mere existence of influential officials opposed to state
amelioration of these local costs does not mean new actions are automatically
doomed to failure. Indeed, this analysis of previous state responses
outlines the strategy most appropriate for implementing new state action
aimed at reducing these costs. DMs perceiving significant costs that
require new state action might consider the following four steps before
proposing new action.
Since, many state officials still feel these costs are insignificant
and therefore do not warrant state involvement, the first step in demon-
strating that these costs are not only serious but also long-term, that
they do not disappear quickly, and that, in the meantime, they burden
localities.
Once their significance has been established, state officials must
be convinced that local control, no matter how broad, cannot reduce these
costs. Although localities might conceivably exclude developments (if
their power were expended), they would not be able to anticipate
developments and regulate all of these activities.
Once state responsibility has been established, one must show
other DMs the need for a response differing from previous ones. Reasons
for "no action" have disappeared: other states have addressed the local
costs from energy development without discouraging it; studies both in
Texas and in other states provide ample analysis of the problems and
alternative solutions. "No new action" is also inappropriate. The
existing assistance programs cover only a portion of the local costs. The
symptoms may look the same (over-crowded schools), but the causes of
boomtown costs differ enough from those of other local costs, that the
same solution does not work. Current environmental regulations ignore
developments' impacts on human resources, which are just as important
for future generations as physical resources. The only option left is
new state action.
Any proposal fornew state action must be defensible on the
ground that it does not include unnecessary expansion of state power.
The costs it addresses must be pervasive and a serious threat to the
state's future. Unless incremental change has been tried the wisest
move in Texas is first to recommend small adjustments in state procedures
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as a way of reducing local costs. If incremental change proves
ineffective, then new programs are more acceptable politically. Recommen-
dations for major structural changes should be made as a last resort, when
other options are perceived as completely inadequate.
The currently proposed Coastal Management Program attempts to
move the state from piecemeal environmental regulation, Decision 5B, to
coordinated and thorough controls, Decision 5Ci. The consensus process
used to design this program has convined both the General Land Office and
its consultants that the program represents the maximum amoung of change
acceptable in addressing local costs from energy development. If this
observation is accurate, then influential DMs consider energy development
impacts as either (i) insignificant, (ii) significant but a local
responsibility, or (iii) significant but adequately covered by current
programs and regulations. These three perceptions must be addressed and
changed before a DM cansuccessfully implement a new state action
mitigating local costs.
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